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ABSTRACT
What is the effect of increasing life expectancy on economic growth? To answer this question, we
exploit the international epidemiological transition, the wave of international health innovations and
improvements that began in the 1940s. We obtain estimates of mortality by disease before the 1940s
from the League of Nations and national public health sources. Using these data, we construct an
instrument for changes in life expectancy, referred to as predicted mortality, which is based on the
pre-intervention distribution of mortality from various diseases around the world and dates of global
interventions. We document that predicted mortality has a large and robust effect on changes in life
expectancy starting in 1940, but no effect on changes in life expectancy before the interventions. The
instrumented changes in life expectancy have a large effect on population; a 1% increase in life
expectancy leads to an increase in population of about 1.5%. Life expectancy has a much smaller
effect on total GDP both initially and over a 40-year horizon, however. Consequently, there is no
evidence that the large exogenous increase in life expectancy led to a significant increase in per
capita economic growth. These results confirm that global efforts to combat poor health conditions
in less developed countries can be highly effective, but also shed doubt on claims that unfavorable














sjohnson@mit.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Improving health around the world today is an important social objective, which has obvious
direct payoﬀs in terms of longer and better lives for millions.1 There is also a growing consensus
that improving health can have equally large indirect payoﬀs through accelerating economic
growth.2 For example, Gallup and Sachs (2001, p. 91) argue that wiping out malaria in sub-
Saharan Africa could increase that continent’s per capita growth rate by as much as 2.6% a
year, and a recent report by the World Health Organization (2001) states:
“in today’s world, poor health has particularly pernicious eﬀects on economic develop-
ment in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and pockets of high disease and intense poverty
elsewhere” (p. 24) and
“...extending the coverage of crucial health services... to the world’s poor could save millions
of lives each year, reduce poverty, spur economic development and promote global security”
(p. i).
The evidence supporting this recent consensus is not yet conclusive, however. Although
cross-country regression studies show a strong correlation between measures of health (for
example, life expectancy or infant mortality) and both the level of economic development and
recent economic growth, these studies have not established a causal eﬀect of health and disease
environments on economic growth. Since countries suﬀering from short life expectancy and
ill-health are also disadvantaged in other ways (and often this is the reason for their poor
health outcomes), such macro studies may be capturing the negative eﬀects of these other,
often omitted, disadvantages. While a range of micro studies demonstrate the importance of
health for individual productivity, as discussed below, these studies do not resolve the question
of whether health diﬀerences are at the root of the large income diﬀerences we observe today
and whether improvements in health will increase economic growth substantially.
This paper investigates the eﬀect of life expectancy at birth–as a general measure of the
health of the population–on economic growth. We exploit the large improvements in life
expectancy, especially among the relatively poor nations, driven by international health inter-
ventions, more eﬀective public health measures, and the introduction of new chemicals and
drugs starting in the 1940s.3 This episode, which we refer to as the international epidemio-
logical transition, led to an unprecedented improvement in life expectancy in a large number
1See Becker, Phillipson and Soares (2005) and Deaton (2003 and 2004) for recent analyses.
2See, among others, Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup and Sachs (2001), World Health Organization (2001),
Alleyne and Cohen (2002), Bloom and Canning (2005), and Lorentzon, Wacziarg, and McMillan (2005).
3T h e r ew e r es o m ee ﬀective medical and public health innovations prior to 1940. But the positive eﬀects from
these innovations were concentrated in richer countries.
1of countries.4 Figure 1 shows this by plotting life expectancy in countries that were initially
(circa 1940) poor, middle income, and rich. It illustrates that while in the 1930s life expectancy
was low in many poor and middle-income countries, this transition brought their levels of life
expectancy close to those prevailing in richer parts of the world.5 As a consequence of these
developments, health conditions in many parts of the less-developed world today, though still
in dire need of improvement, are signiﬁcantly better than the corresponding health conditions
were in the West at the same stage of development.6
The international epidemiological transitionp r o v i d e su sw i t ha ne m p i r i c a ls t r a t e g yt oi s o -
late potentially-exogenous changes in health conditions. The eﬀects of the international epi-
demiological transition on a country’s life expectancy were related to the extent to which its
population was initially (circa 1940) aﬀected by various speciﬁc diseases, for example, tuber-
culosis, malaria, and pneumonia, and to the timing of the various health interventions.
The early data on mortality by disease are available from standard international sources,
though they have not been widely used in the economics literature. These data allow us to
create an instrument for changes in life expectancy based on the pre-intervention distribution
of mortality from various diseases around the world and the dates of global intervention (e.g.,
discovery and mass production of penicillin and streptomycin, or the discovery and widespread
use of DDT against mosquito vectors). The only source of variation in this instrument, which
we refer to as predicted mortality, comes from the interaction of baseline cross-country dis-
ease prevalence with global intervention dates for speciﬁc diseases. We document that there
were large declines in disease-speciﬁc mortality following these global interventions. More im-
4The term epidemiological transition was coined by demographers and refers to the process of falling mortality
rates after about 1850, associated with the switch from infectious to degenerative disease as the major cause of
death (Omran, 1971). Some authors prefer the term “health transition,” as this includes the changing nature
of ill health more generally (e.g., Riley, 2001). Our focus is on the rapid decline in mortality (and improvement
in health) in poorer countries after 1940, most of which was driven by the fast spread of new technologies and
practices around the world (hence the adjective “international”). The seminal works on this episode include
Stolnitz (1955), Omran (1971), and Preston (1975a).
5This ﬁgure is for illustration purposes and should be interpreted with caution, since convergence is not
generally invariant to nonlinear transformations. Our empirical strategy below does not exploit this convergence
pattern; instead, it relies on potentially-exogenous changes in life expectancy.
In these ﬁgures and throughout the paper, the initially rich countries are those with income per capita in 1940
above the level of Argentina (the richest Latin American country at that time, according to Maddison’s data, in
our base sample). These are, in ascending order, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Germany,
Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The initially poor countries
are those with income per capita below that of Portugal, which was the poorest European nation in our base
sample. These are, in ascending order: China, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, El Salvador,
Honduras, Indonesia, Brazil, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Korea, Ecuador, and the Philippines. Because of
data quality issues, African nations are not included in our base sample, but they are used in robustness checks
in Section 7. See Appendix Table A1 for a list of initially rich, middle-income and poor countries.
6For example, life expectancy at birth in India in 1999 was 60 compared to 40 in Britain in 1820, when
income per capita was approximately the same level as in India today (Maddison, 2001, p. 30). From Maddison
(2001, p. 264), income per capita in Britain in 1820 was $1707, while it stood at $1746 in India in 1998 (all
ﬁgures in 1990 international dollars).
2portantly, we show that the predicted mortality instrument has a large and robust eﬀect on
changes in life expectancy starting in 1940, but has no eﬀect on changes in life expectancy
prior to this date (i.e., before the key interventions).
The instrumented changes in life expectancy have a fairly large eﬀect on population; a
1% increase in life expectancy is related to an approximately 1.3-1.8% increase in population.
The magnitude of this estimate indicates that the decline in fertility rates was insuﬃcient to
compensate for increased life expectancy, a result which we directly conﬁrm by looking at the
relationship between life expectancy and total births.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on total GDP (though our
two standard error conﬁdence intervals do include economically signiﬁcant eﬀects). More
importantly, relative growth rates for GDP per capita (and GDP per working age population)
show some decline in countries experiencing large increases in life expectancy. In fact, our
estimates exclude any positive eﬀects of life expectancy on GDP per capita within a 40-year
horizon. This is consistent with the overall pattern in Figure 2, which, in contrast to Figure
1, shows no convergence in income per capita between initially poor, middle-income and rich
countries. Similarly, we ﬁnd no evidence of an increase in human capital investments associated
with improvements in life expectancy.
The most natural interpretation of our results comes from neoclassical growth theory. The
ﬁrst-order eﬀect of increased life expectancy is to increase population, which initially reduces
capital-to-labor and land-to-labor ratios, thus depressing income per capita. This initial decline
is later compensated by higher output as more people enter the labor force. This compensa-
tion can be complete and may even exceed the initial level of income per capita if there are
signiﬁcant productivity beneﬁts from longer life expectancy. Yet, the compensation may also
be incomplete if the beneﬁts from higher life expectancy are limited and if some factors of pro-
duction, for example land, are supplied inelastically. A smaller initial eﬀect on GDP than the
longer-run eﬀect is also consistent with the neoclassical growth model when the accumulation
of capital is slow.
The role of changes in capital-labor ratios in the above discussion also suggests that we
should expect less negative (or more positive) eﬀects on income per capita in economies that
have higher investment rates. We investigate this by estimating models that allow for interac-
tions between life expectancy and initial GDP per capita or initial investment rates (for which
the data are less reliable), and ﬁnd some support for this hypothesis.
Our ﬁndings do not imply that improved health has not been a great beneﬁtt ol e s s -
developed nations during the postwar era. On the contrary, they suggest that global eﬀorts
can signiﬁcantly improve health conditions in less developed countries, and they may be able to
do so without large long-run costs in terms of income per capita. The accounting approach of
Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), which incorporates information on longevity and health
3as well as standards of living, would then suggest that these interventions have considerably
improved “overall welfare” in these countries. What these interventions have not done, and in
fact were not intended to do, is to increase output per capita in these countries.
Furthermore, our results, though suggestive, may not directly apply to the present date be-
cause of the diﬀerent nature of diseases now prevalent in poor countries, in particular, because
of HIV/AIDS. Many of the diseases brought under greater control during the international
epidemiological transition were primarily killers of children.7 In contrast, arguably the most
serious health problem in the poorest parts of the world today, HIV/AIDS, aﬀects those at
the peak of their labor productivity. Preventing HIV/AIDS could conceivably have diﬀerent
eﬀects from those we estimate here.
It is also important to note that the micro estimates have established beyond reasonable
doubt that improved health leads to better individual economic outcomes.8 Nevertheless,
these estimates do not directly answer the question of how important diﬀerences in disease en-
vironments and health conditions are in accounting for cross-country income disparities, and
are diﬃcult to compare with our results, because they do not incorporate general equilibrium
eﬀects (in addition, there still remains a great deal of uncertainty about the precise size of
the relevant eﬀects). The most important general equilibrium eﬀect arises because of dimin-
ishing returns to eﬀective units of labor (for example, because land and/or physical capital
are supplied inelastically). In the presence of such diminishing returns, micro estimates will
exaggerate the aggregate productivity beneﬁts from improved health, especially when health
improvements are accompanied by population increases. This may be an important concern
since existing estimates of production functions, theory and also our our results suggest that
there are indeed diminishing returns to labor.9
Our paper is most closely related to two recent contributions, Weil (2005) and Young
(2005). Weil calibrates the eﬀects of health using a range of micro estimates, and ﬁnds that
7The exception is tuberculosis. The age proﬁle of deaths from tuberculosis pre-1940 was closer to that of
AIDS today–with a heavy burden on young adults. The greatest impact of the remaining diseases were on
children, but not necessarily on infants (e.g., endemic malaria typically has highest fatality rates for children
between ages 1 and 5). Our analysis of the (somewhat less reliable) data on infant mortality shows no evidence
of a diﬀerential eﬀect of the international epidemiological transition on infant mortality or survival rates (these
results are not reported to save space).
8See Strauss and Thomas (1998) for an excellent survey of the research until the late 1990s. For some of the
more recent research, see Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Bleakley (2002, 2004), Miguel and Kremer (2004),
and Schultz (2002).
9Another general equilibrium eﬀect arises when healthier individuals have higher earnings partly because
they are successful in competing against less healthy individuals in the labor market (for example, for scarce
high-paying jobs); when such competition eﬀects are present, all individuals becoming healthier would have
smaller eﬀects than those implied by the micro estimates. See Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman (2004) for
evidence suggesting that the major eﬀect of height on economic outcomes may be through a “competitive
advantage” in adolescence.
4these eﬀects could be quite important in the aggregate (see also Bloom and Canning, 2005).10
The major diﬀerence between Weil’s approach and ours is that the conceptual exercise in
his paper is concerned with the eﬀects of improved health holding population constant. In
contrast, our estimates look at the general equilibrium eﬀects of improved health from the
most important health transition of the 20th century, which takes the form of both improved
health and increased life expectancy (and thus population). Young evaluates the eﬀect of the
recent HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. Using micro estimates and calibration of the neoclassical
growth model, he shows that the decline in population resulting from HIV/AIDS may increase
income per capita despite signiﬁcant disruptions and human suﬀering caused by the disease.11
In addition, our work is related to the literature on the demographic transition both in the
West and in the rest of the world, including the seminal contribution of McKeown (1976) and
studies by Arriaga and Davis (1969), Preston (1975a, 1980), Caldwell (1986), Kelley (1988),
Fogel (1986, 2004), and Deaton (2003, 2004). More recent work by Cutler and Miller (2005)
ﬁnds that the introduction of clean water accounts for about half of the decline in US mortality
in the early 20th century (see also Cutler and Miller, 2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a simple
model to illustrate the factors that determine the eﬀect of increased life expectancy on economic
growth. Section 3 describes the health interventions and the data on disease mortality rates and
life expectancy that we constructed from a variety of primary sources. Section 4 presents our
estimating framework and the ordinary least square (OLS) relationship between life expectancy
and a range of outcomes. Section 5 discusses the construction of our instrument and shows
the ﬁrst-stage relationships, robustness checks, falsiﬁcation exercises, and other supporting
evidence. Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7 presents a number of robustness checks
and additional results, and Section 8 concludes. Appendices A and B provide information on
data sources, data construction and the diseases used in this study. Appendix C, which provides
further details and some additional results, is available upon request.
2 Motivating Theory
To frame the empirical analysis, we ﬁrst derive the medium-run and long-run implications of
increased life expectancy in the closed-economy neoclassical (Solow) growth model. All labor
and land are supplied inelastically. We represent all of health in terms of life expectancy.12
10Weil’s baseline estimate uses the return to the age of menarche from Knaul’s (2000) work on Mexico as a
general indicator of “overall return to health”. Using Behrman and Rosenzweig’s (2004) estimates from returns
to birthweight diﬀerences in monozygotic twins, he ﬁnds smaller eﬀects.
11For more pessimistic views on the economic consequences of HIV/AIDS, see Arndt and Lewis (2000), Bell,
Devarajan, and Gersbach (2003) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2006).
12Life expectancy here and throughout the paper is interpreted as a proxy (index) for the overall health of
the population. In practice, the decline in mortality from infectious disease and the corresponding increase







where α + β ≤ 1, Kit denotes capital, Lit denotes the supply of land, and Hit is the eﬀective
units of labor given by
Hit = hitNit,
where Nit is total population (and hence employment), while hit is human capital per person.
Without loss of any generality, we normalize Lit = Li =1f o ra l li and t.L e tu sa l s oﬁrst as-
sume that Ait = Ai for all i and t. Capital depreciates at the rate δ and the savings/investment
rate of country i is constant and equal to si, which implies:
Kit+1 = siYit +( 1− δ)Kit.
Suppose that there exists ¯ t<∞ such that for all t ≥ ¯ t, human capital per person and
population are constant, i.e.,
hit = hi and Nit = Ni for all t ≥ ¯ t.





Substituting into (1) and taking logs we obtain a simple relationship between income per




















1 − α − β
1 − β
logNi.
This equation shows that income per capita is aﬀected positively by technology, Ai,h u m a n
capital, hi, and the investment rate, si, and negatively by population, Ni.
For industrialized economies where land plays a small role in production (because only a
small fraction of output is produced in agriculture), we can reasonably presume 1−α−β ' 0
in life expectancy resulting from the international epidemiological transition have been closely associated with
increased overall health and reduced morbidity (in particular, fewer incidences of illness from infectious disease,
including less incapacity from tuberculosis, malaria, pneumonia, and lower incidence of illness in childhood).
For example, before 1958 there were 817,000 cases of malaria in Venezuela, but after DDT spraying and other
eradication eﬀorts, there were only 800 cases. In Taiwan, there were about 1 million cases of malaria in 1954;
a similar anti-malaria campaign was so eﬀective that by 1969 there were only 9 cases. Most of these cases of
malaria in both countries were associated with sickness and morbidity, not necessarily mortality (Lancaster,
1990, Chapter 15). See also Riley (1993 and 2001) on the relationship between mortality and health in the
19th-century Britain.
6and population drops out of equation (2). Nevertheless, for many less-developed countries,
where agriculture is still important, we should expect 1−α−β>0 and the direct eﬀect of an
increase in population may be to reduce income per capita even in the steady state (i.e., even
once the capital stock has adjusted to the increase in population).13
Greater life expectancy will ﬁrst lead to greater population (both directly and also poten-
tially indirectly by increasing total births), so we posit:
Nit = ¯ NiXλ
it, (3)
where Xit is life expectancy in country i at time t. Better health and longer life spans may
also increase productivity through a variety of channels, including more rapid human capital
accumulation or direct positive eﬀects on (total factor) productivity.14 To capture the bene-
ﬁcial eﬀects of these variables on productivity emphasized in the literature, let us assume the
following isoelastic relationships:
Ait = ¯ AiX
γ
it and hit = ¯ hiX
η
it, (4)
where ¯ Ai and ¯ hi are some baseline diﬀerences across countries.
To focus on long run (steady-state) relationships, suppose that Xit = Xi (at least for t ≥ ¯ t















1 − α − β
1 − β
log ¯ Ni +
1
1 − β
(α(γ + η) − (1 − α − β)λ)xi
where xi ≡ logXi is log life expectancy and recall that yi ≡ log(Yi/Ni).
An increase in life expectancy therefore leads to a signiﬁcant increase in long-run income
per capita when there are limited diminishing returns (i.e., 1 − α − β is small) and when
life expectancy creates a substantial externality on technology (high γ) and/or encourages
signiﬁcant increases in human capital (high η). On the contrary, when γ and η are small and
1 − α − β is large, an increase in life expectancy can reduce income per capita even in the
steady state.
13See Galor and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Galor (2005) for models in which at diﬀerent
stages of development the relationship between population and income may change because of a change in
the composition of output or technology. In these models, during an early Malthusian phase, land plays an
important role as a factor of production and there are strong diminishing returns to capital. Later in the
development process, the role of land diminishes, allowing per capita income growth. Hansen and Prescott
(2002), for example, assume a Cobb-Douglas production function during the Malthusian phase with a share of
land equal to 0.3.
14On the potential eﬀects of life expectancy and health on productivity, see Bloom and Sachs (1998). On their
eﬀects on human capital accumulation, see, among others, Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000), Kalemli-
Ozcan (2002) or Soares (2005), which point out that when people live longer, they will have greater incentives
to invest in human capital.
7Equation (5) applies to the “long run” once the capital stock has adjusted to the increase
in population. It is also interesting to look at what happens to output in the “medium run”
where the capital stock is constant (or before it has fully adjusted). This medium-run scenario
would be particularly relevant to countries that have low savings rates and can only attract
limited foreign capital. To illustrate this point, consider the extreme case where the capital









or substituting for (4) and (3), we have:
yi ≡ β log ¯ Ki + αlog ¯ Ai + αlog¯ hi +( 6 )
−(1 − α)log ¯ Ni +( α(γ + η) − (1 − α)λ)xi.
Comparing this equation to equation (5), we see that the medium-run eﬀect of an increase in
life expectancy is more negative (or less positive). This is intuitive: the response to an increase
in Ni before the capital stock adjusts to its new steady-state level will be a reduction in the
capital-labor ratio, further reducing income per capita.
Our empirical strategy below is to estimate equations similar to (5) and (6), and compare
the estimates to the parameters in these equations.
It is also evident that how quickly an economy approaches the long-run equilibrium depends
on its savings and investment rate. Therefore, this framework also suggests that we should
investigate the impact of the interaction between life expectancy and the investment rate on
the evolution of income per capita.
3 Background and Data
3.1 International Epidemiological Transition
Early improvements in public health began in Western Europe, the United States and a few
other places from the mid-nineteenth century.15 Initially progress was through empirically
observing what worked, but soon came major breakthroughs connected with the germ theory
of disease. By 1900, tropical medicine had also made impressive progress, most notably with
Ronald Ross’s demonstration that mosquitoes transmitted malaria and with practical advances
against yellow fever in the Caribbean.
Nevertheless, through 1940 most of the progress in improving mortality was conﬁned to
relatively rich countries, with some–but more limited–impact in Southern and Eastern Eu-
15Cutler, Deaton, Lleras-Murray (2006, pp. 11-12) also point out that new drugs, primarily antibiotics and
sulphonamide drugs, had an important impact on US mortality between the 1930s and 1960.
8rope. In most of the Americas, Africa, and Asia, there were even more limited improvements.16
In part, this was because there were few eﬀective drugs against major killers, so most of the
measures were relatively expensive public works (e.g., to drain swamps). Colonial authorities
showed little enthusiasm for such expenditure.
The situation changed dramatically from around 1940 mainly because of four factors. First,
there was a wave of global drug innovations. Many of these products oﬀered cures eﬀective
against major killers in developing countries. The most important was the discovery and
subsequent mass production of penicillin, which provided an eﬀective treatment against a
range of bacterial infections (National Academy of Sciences, 1970, Easterlin, 1999). Penicillin,
which was only used in small quantities even in the most developed countries through the mid-
1940s (Conybeare, 1948, p. 66), became widely available by the early 1950s (see, e.g., Valentine
and Shooter, 1954).17 Further antibiotic development quickly followed, most notably with the
discovery of streptomycin, which was eﬀective against tuberculosis. Between 1940 and 1950,
the major bacterial killers became treatable and, in most cases, curable. Diseases that could
now be treated, for most people without serious side eﬀects, included pneumonia, dysentery,
cholera, and venereal diseases. Antibiotics also reduced deaths indirectly caused by (and
attributed to) viruses, such as inﬂuenza, which often kill by weakening the immune system
and allowing secondary bacterial infections to develop. Also important during the same period
was the development of new vaccines, for example, against yellow fever.18
The second reason for the dramatic improvement in health was the discovery of DDT
(Dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethylene), which allowed a major breakthrough in attempts to con-
trol one of the major killers of children in less-developed regions of the world, malaria.19
Desowitz describes the impact of DDT as follows:
16During the 1920s and 1930s, there were measures to reduce mortality from smallpox and cholera in Indonesia,
smallpox and plague in the Philippines, malaria in India, malaria and respiratory and diarrheal diseases in the
British Guyana (see, for example, Preston 1980, Mandle 1970). Gwatkin (1980, p. 616) states: “But such
increases [in life expectancy] were modest compared with those that came later, for soon after World War II
annual gains in life expectancy averaging over a year were recorded for periods of up to a decade in such diverse
places as Taiwan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Jamaica, and Mexico”.
17Fleming isolated penicillin in the 1930s but could not produce it in any signiﬁcant quantity; Florey and
Chain made the breakthroughs essential for using penicillin as a drug and they shared the Nobel prize with
Fleming in 1945 (see, e.g., Chain, 1980). The ﬁrst large-scale use of penicillin was in 1943, by Allied armies in
N o r t hA f r i c a . A n d r e wM o y e r ’ sp a t e n ti n1 9 4 8i so f t e nr e g a r d e da sam a j o rs t e pi ni t sm a s sp r o d u c t i o n . T h e
invention of penicillin led to a wave of discovery of other antibiotics, including streptomycin, chloromycetin,
aureomycin, and terramycin (The National Academy, 1970, p. 147). Waksman discovered streptomycin in
1944 and was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1952 (see, Keers, 1978, for details and also on the importance of
streptomycin).
18The yellow fever vaccine was invented by Max Theiler in 1930 and became widely available in the 1940s.
Theiler was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1951. A great deal more vaccine invention followed in the 1950s and 1960s
(e.g., against small pox and measles), but antibiotics already provided usually eﬀective treatment against those
diseases.
19DDT was ﬁrst synthesized in 1874, but the discovery of its insecticide properties was much later–in 1939,
by Paul H. M¨ uller; he received a patent for the insecticide in 1940, and was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1948
(Alilio et al, 2004, p. 270).
9“There was nothing quite like [DDT] before and has been nothing quite like it since. Here
was a chemical that could be sprayed on the walls of a house and for up to six months later
any insect that alighted or rested on that wall would die. It was virtually without toxicity
to humans. And, for the icing on the chemical cake, it was dirt-cheap to manufacture”
(1991, pp. 62-63).
Aggressive use of inexpensive DDT led to the rapid eradication of malaria in Taiwan, much of
the Caribbean, the Balkans, parts of northern Africa, northern Australia, large parts of South
Paciﬁc, and all but eradicated malaria in Sri Lanka and India (see, e.g., Davis, 1956).
The third pillar of the improvements in public health was the establishment of the World
Health Organization (WHO), which greatly facilitated the spread of medical and public health
technology to poorer countries.20 From the 1950s, the WHO, together with other UN-related
bodies, most signiﬁcantly, UNICEF, was the driving force behind the public health (e.g., anti-
malaria campaigns) and immunization drives (e.g., against smallpox).21 The US military also
played a signiﬁcant role in developing treatments for diseases like cholera and spreading the
use of DDT and penicillin.22
The fourth factor was a change in international values. As Preston (1975a) emphasizes,
after the 1930s:
“Universal values assured that health breakthroughs in any country would spread rapidly
to all others where the means for implementation existed” (p. 243).
The consequence of the combination of these four factors was a dramatic improvement in
life expectancy in much of the world, especially in the lesser developed parts of the globe,
starting in the 1940s. Most of the key changes were available in almost all countries by 1950.
As a result, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, there were signiﬁcant improvements in health
conditions and life expectancy in Central America, South Asia, and parts of Eastern and
Southern Europe compared to richer countries.23
20It is notable that Brazil and China, both poor countries at the time, took the initiative in pushing for the
formation of the WHO (WHO, 1998). A central goal of the organization was to diﬀuse medical practices and
technology to poorer countries. Between the world wars, the League of Nations was responsible for international
d i s e a s ei n t e r v e n t i o n sa n dw o r k e dw i t ho t h e rE u r o p e a norganizations, for example, against typhus in Eastern
Europe (see also Oﬃce International d’Hygiene Publique, 1933). However, in contrast with the WHO, the
League of Nations showed less interest in and had limited resources for combating diseases in less-developed
countries, and focused on monitoring epidemics that might spread to the West.
21Lee et al (1996) report: “[Founded in 1946]... Unicef was given the task of utilising its resources ‘for
child health purposes generally’. When the WHO came on to the scene two years later it was accepted that
coordination on health matters was needed. This led to the creation of the WHO/Unicef joint committee on
health policy, with the WHO, importantly, designated as the lead health organisation.”
22Captain Phillips of the U.S. Navy was involved in developing intravenous rehydration methods in Cairo
after 1946 and Taipei after 1955 (Savarino, 2002); he was also the ﬁrst to try oral glucose saline on two cholera
patients (Bhattacharya, 1994).
23Davis (1956) was probably the ﬁrst to write about this in the economics literature. He stressed that “these
103.2 Coding Diseases
Central to our empirical strategy is to construct cross-country mortality rates for various
diseases before the 1940s. For this purpose, we have collected comparable data on 15 of the
most important infectious diseases across a wide range of countries. In all cases, the primary
data source is national health statistics, as collected and republished by the League of Nations
(until 1940) and the World Health Organization and the United Nations (after 1945). We have
tried several diﬀerent ways of constructing these data, all of which produce similar results.
We conﬁrm the validity of these numbers using the qualitative and quantitative evidence
in Lancaster (1990, especially, Chapter 48), the maps and discussion of Cliﬀ, Haggett, and
Smallman-Raynor (2004) and the maps of disease incidence published by the American Geo-
graphical Society (1951a, b, c, and d) immediately after World War II. Appendix A provides
details on sources and construction. Further details are contained in Appendix C. Information
on the etiology and epidemiology of each disease is obtained from the comprehensive recent
surveys in Kiple (1993) and other sources (see Appendix B). To the extent possible, we have
also checked our data against those reported in Preston and Nelson (1974).
The other building block for our approach is global intervention dates for each speciﬁc
disease, that is, dates of signiﬁcant events potentially reducing mortality around the world
from the disease in question. These events are described below (and in Appendix B) and the
relevant dates were obtained from WHO Epidemiological Reports, as well as National Academy
of Sciences (1970), Preston (1975a), Kiple (1993), Easterlin (1999), and Hoﬀ and Smith (2000).
The 15 diseases we focus on are tuberculosis, malaria, pneumonia, inﬂuenza, cholera, ty-
phoid, smallpox, whooping cough, measles, diphtheria, scarlet fever, yellow fever, plague, ty-
phus fever, and dysentery. The most important killers in this list are tuberculosis, malaria,
and pneumonia, which we discuss in this section. Information about the remaining diseases is
summarized in Appendix B.
Tuberculosis was probably the largest single cause of death around the world in 1940.
It is primarily caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis, transmitted through the air. Vaccina-
tion had been available from the 1920s, but the breakthrough cure was the 1944 invention of
streptomycin.24 The drug spread quickly and has remained important. Following the above
discussion of the invention and introduction of penicillin and streptomycin, we code the inter-
vention against tuberculosis in the 1940s.
areas do not need to become economically developed to reduce their death rates drastically” (p. 305) and that
this pattern in the relatively poor parts of the world had no precedent in richer countries. See Stolnitz (1955)
and Preston (1975a) for early discussions of this large decline in mortality in the demography literature.
24Previously tuberculosis could be treated by surgery, but even in the UK resources for this were limited and
not available to many patients (Conybeare, 1948, p. 61). One discussant of Conybeare (1948) made the point,
based on data from the UK’s Statisical Reviews, that comparing 1939 with 1931-35, “in the general population
tuberculosis had not recently been a decreasing risk at all.” This was on the eve of the dramatic impact of
streptomycin (Keers, 1978).
11Malaria is caused by four types of parasites, transmitted by the bite of an infected female
Anopheles mosquito. Control of mosquito vectors had been underway since the late nineteenth
century, but became much more eﬀective with the discovery that DDT was an eﬀective insecti-
cide (see Expert Committee on Malaria, 1947, pp. 26-28). The use of DDT became widespread
in the late 1940s (particularly following a successful demonstration in Greece) and was intensi-
ﬁed following the 1955-57 WHO decision to campaign systematically to eradicate malaria (see
Bradley, 1992, WHO, 2004).25 In our baseline instrument, the intervention against malaria is
taken to be the extensive use of DDT during the 1940s (chloroquine was also invented during
the 1940s and quickly replaced mepacrine as the antimalarial drug of choice, until chloroquine-
resistant parasites developed). In our alternative instrument, we code it as taking place in the
1950s because of the WHO campaign to eradicate malaria.
Pneumonia is caused by a variety of infectious agents and toxins, including various bacterial
and viral pathogens. Frequently, it appears as a secondary bacterial infection that causes death.
The primary causes are often tuberculosis, inﬂuenza, and more recently AIDS. Antibiotics, for
example penicillin, proved highly eﬀective against bacterial pneumonia in the 1940s (although
by now resistant strains have developed).26 Also, from the 1940s there were partially eﬀective
vaccines against pneumonia. In our baseline instrument, the intervention against pneumonia
takes place in the 1940s.
3.3 Life Expectancy, Population, and GDP Data
Data on life expectancy at birth, total births, and infant mortality are obtained from historical
UN data (various issues of the Demographic Yearbook) and League of Nations reports.27
Since we need population and GDP data before World War II, we use the data compiled
by Maddison (2003). Postwar demographic data are from UN data sources (see Appendix A).
Our base sample consists of 59 countries, from Western Europe, Oceania, the Americas,
and Asia. East European and Russia are excluded from the base sample (because of concerns
about the quality of their GDP data), but are included in robustness checks.28 Because of the
25While it is generally accepted that DDT played a major role in the dramatic declines in malaria prevalence,
there is some controversy in the demography literature about whether broader public health interventions of
the 1940s were also essential (see, e.g., Langford, 1996).
Following the WHO campaign, it became apparent that some mosquitos could develop resistance to insecti-
cides. However, the view from the WHO was that spraying with DDT remained eﬀective, if used properly. E.
J .P a m p a n a( 1 9 5 4 ) ,c h i e fo ft h eM a l a r i aS e c t i o no ft h eW HO, called for a change in strategy, but still centered
around residual-insecticide spraying.
26Sulphonamides were also used against pneumonia, but were soon superceded by penicillin (Conybeare 1948,
p. 65, National Academy of Sciences, 1970, pp. 144-146). In any case, these drugs were not widely available,
even in the UK, until the very end of the 1930s (Conybeare, 1948).
27All of these data are rough estimates. For example, life expectancy is calculated by combining data on age-
speciﬁc death rates at a point in time, but often approximations are made using standard life tables. Preston
(1975a) previously used some of the pre-war data for the 1930s. See Appendices A and C for more details.
28The only communist country in our sample is China. Excluding China has no eﬀect on any of our results.
12poorer quality of the available data, Africa is not in our baseline sample, but results including
Africa are reported in Section 7 and are very similar to the baseline estimates.
We focus on the period 1940 to 1980 as our base sample, with observations for 1940, 1950,
1960, 1970 and 1980. We look at pre-1940 changes in our falsiﬁcation exercises. Post-1980 is
excluded because the emergence of AIDS appears to have led to a divergence in life expectancy
between some poor countries and the richer nations.29 Nevertheless, we report additional
robustness checks by extending our sample through 2000 (particularly as this allows us to look
at longer potential lags in the impact of health on economic outcomes).
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics on the key variables (see also the raw data in
Appendix Table A1). The ﬁrst column is for the whole world, while the second column refers
to our base sample. A comparison of these two columns indicates that, despite the absence of
Africa from our base sample, averages of life expectancy, population, GDP and GDP per capita
are similar between the whole world and our sample. The next three columns show numbers
separately for the three groups of countries used in Figures 1 and 2–initially rich, middle-
income, and poor countries (measured in terms of GDP per capita in 1940). These columns
show the same patterns as Figures 1 and 2: there is a large convergence in life expectancy
among the three groups of countries between 1940 and 1980, but no convergence in GDP per
capita. The three columns also give information on predicted mortality, which will be our
instrument for life expectancy.
4 Estimation Framework and OLS Estimates
4.1 Estimation Framework
Our empirical approach is to estimate equations similar to equations (5) and (6) above. We
interpret these equations as providing the conditional expectation function for our variables of
interest. Thus, adding an error term, our estimating equation becomes
yit+k = πxit + ζi + µt + Z0
itβ + εit+k (7)
where y is log income per capita, ζi is a ﬁxed eﬀect capturing potential technology diﬀerences
and other time-invariant omitted eﬀects, µt incorporates time-varying factors common across
all countries, Z is a vector of other controls, and x is log life expectancy at birth as deﬁned
above. The coeﬃcient π is the parameter of interest.30 Including a full set of country ﬁxed
29In addition, malaria reappeared in the 1970s and 1980s because of reduced international eﬀorts, the interna-
tional ban on the use of DDT, and the emergence of insecticide resistant mosquitoes and drug-resistant strains
of malaria. Tuberculosis has also returned as a secondary infection associated with AIDS.
30Given equations (5) and (6) above and the regression models used in the existing literature, we use log life
expectancy on the right hand side throughout. The results are very similar if we use the level of life expectancy
instead (results available upon request).
13eﬀects, the ζi’s, is important, since many country-speciﬁc factors will simultaneously aﬀect
health and economic outcomes; ﬁxed eﬀects at least remove the time-invariant components of
these factors.31
Notice also that in equation (7) the left-hand side variable has timing potentially diﬀerent
from the right-hand side variables. This allows us to investigate potential diﬀerences between
medium-run and long-run eﬀects. In particular, for k>0, this equation would estimate the
eﬀect of life expectancy diﬀerences at time t on future (date t+k) income per capita diﬀerences.
Before investigating the eﬀect of life expectancy on income per capita, we look at its eﬀects
on population, total births, and total income. The equations for these outcome variables are
identical to (7), with the only diﬀerence being the dependent variable.
The most serious challenges in estimating the causal eﬀect of life expectancy on income per
capita or population are potential omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In particular,
in equation (7), typically the (population) covariance term Cov(xit,ε it+k)i sn o te q u a lt o0 ,
because even conditional on ﬁxed eﬀects, health could be endogenous to economics.
Our empirical strategy is to exploit the potentially-exogenous source of variation in life
expectancy because of global interventions. More speciﬁcally, our ﬁrst-stage relationship is
xit = ψMI
it + ˜ ζi +˜ µt + Z0
it˜ β+uit (8)
where MI
it is predicted mortality, which will be discussed below. The key exclusion restriction
is Cov(MI
it,ε it+k)=0 .
Notice that equation (7) does not allow for mean-reverting dynamics in the outcome vari-
ables. A more general model is:
yit+k = ρyit−1 + πxit + ζi + µt + Z0
itβ + εm
it+k. (9)
Though conceptually attractive, this equation is considerably harder to estimate because of the
simultaneous presence of ﬁxed eﬀects and a lagged dependent variable (see, e.g., Wooldridge,
2002, Chapter 11). This, and the fact that even if the data generating process were given
31Many authors estimate growth regressions of the following form:
git =˜ αyit−1 + πxit−1 + Z
0
itβ + εit
where yit−1 is log income per capita, git is growth between t−1a n dt,a n dxit−1 log life expectancy at birth or
some other measure of health. Since git ' ∆yit,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
yit =( 1+˜ α)yit−1 + πxit−1 + Z
0
itβ + εit
This way of rewriting the above equation highlights that growth regressions are analogous to the levels regressions
like (7) or (9). But since typical growth regressions do not include country ﬁxed eﬀects, the correlation of xit−1
with other potential determinants of income per capitai sl i k e l yt ol e a dt ob i a s e de s t i m a t e s . O u ra p p r o a c h
partially circumvents this problem by including country ﬁxed eﬀects and thus removing the time-invariant
component of such correlation. In Section 7, we also estimate equation (9), which by the same argument here,
is equivalent to a growth regression with ﬁxed eﬀects.
14by (9), instrumental-variables estimate of (7) would lead to consistent estimates of π as long
as Cov(MI
it,ε it+k) = 0, motivates our initial focus on (7). Nevertheless, for completeness, we
report estimates from (9) in subsection 7.2.
Finally, we also estimate a more demanding speciﬁcation of the form:






where yi,1930 denotes the 1930 (“initial”) value of the dependent variable (e.g., log population,
log GDP, etc.), and the summation term represents a full set of interaction between this initial
value and time dummies. This speciﬁcation controls ﬂexibly for mean-reversion, and is also
useful as a check against diﬀerential trends in the dependent variable.
4.2 OLS Estimates
Tables 2 and 3 report OLS regressions for the main variables of interest. These results are useful
both to show the (conditional) correlations in the data and for comparison to the instrumental
variables (IV) estimates reported below. All regressions in these tables and throughout the
paper include a full set of year dummies and country ﬁxed eﬀects, so all estimates exploit only
the within-country variation. Moreover, throughout, all standard errors are robust and allow
for arbitrary serial correlation of the residual at the country level (i.e., they correspond to the
fully robust variance-covariance matrix, see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 275).
Table 2 focuses on log population (Panels A and B) and on log number of births (Panels C
and D). We report results in pairs; ﬁrst, we estimate versions of equation (7) using our baseline
panel, which consists of observations at 10 year intervals between the indicated dates (1940-
1980, 1930-1980, etc.). Second, we estimate “long-diﬀerence” models, essentially the same
equation using only two data points–at the beginning and the end of the sample period. The
ﬁrst approach uses all the available data, while the second approach exploits only the longer-
run changes. The latter may be useful both because it may be less vulnerable to problems
caused by serial correlation in the error term and also because it enables us to be agnostic
on how quickly life expectancy should aﬀect the outcome variables. Also for comparison with
previous work, we report results for the period 1960 to 2000.
A number of features are notable in Table 2. First, the 1960-2000 sample gives very similar
results to our baseline sample of 1940-1980. For example, for the panel between 1960 and
2000, the estimate of the eﬀect of log life expectancy on log population is between 1.46 and
1.69 (standard errors of, respectively, 0.29 and 0.43), whereas the estimate for our base sample
of 1940-1980 is 1.21 (standard error = 0.20). Second, excluding the (initially) richest countries
from the sample (column 4) makes little diﬀerence; now the estimate is 1.24 (standard error
= 0.28). Third, in columns 5-10, we look at the eﬀect of life expectancy on future levels
15of population. In terms of equation (7), this corresponds to the case where k>0. These
results are broadly similar to the contemporaneous results. In all cases, a 1 percent increase in
life expectancy is associated with approximately a 1-1.7 percent increase in population. The
estimates using the long-diﬀerences in Panel B are slightly larger (and slightly less precise),
but broadly similar.
To interpret the eﬀect of (log) life expectancy on (log) population, it is useful to consider a
simple continuous-time statistical model. Suppose each individual faces a Poisson death rate of
1/a. This implies that life expectancy is a.D e n o t et h eﬂow of total births as a function of life
expectancy by B(a)–a constant birth rate would correspond to B(a) being proportional to a.
Equating the ﬂow of deaths, N/a,w i t ht h eﬂow of total births, B (a), gives the steady-state
population level as:
lnN =l na +l nB(a). (11)
This implies that in a regression of log population on log life expectancy, when the total
number of births remains constant, we should expect an elasticity of 1. Naturally if there were
no change in fertility, there would be an increase in the total number of births because of the
increase in population. The elasticity we estimate here suggests that the birth rate did not
decline enough to reduce or keep constant the number of births. This is conﬁrmed in Panels
C and D of Table 2, which show an overall increase in the total number of births in response
to the change in life expectancy.
Table 3 presents results that are parallel to those in Table 2, but now the dependent
variables are log GDP (Panels A and B) and log GDP per capita (Panels C and D). Again,
all regressions have a full set of country and time ﬁxed eﬀects, and we show both panel and
long-diﬀerence estimates.
Panels A and B in Table 3 indicate a positive relationship between log life expectancy and
log GDP. For example, the results in columns 1-4 indicate an eﬀect of life expectancy on GDP
with an elasticity of approximately 0.7-1.7.32
Columns 5-10 again look at leads. With the exception of column 6, which corresponds to
a 20-year lead, the estimates are similar to those in columns 1-4. Overall, the results in Table
3 suggest the presence of a positive and typically signiﬁcant eﬀect of life expectancy on total
GDP. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, these results do not correspond to the causal eﬀect
of life expectancy on total output, and might reﬂect the fact that life expectancy increases
precisely when countries are adopting other measures that increase income, or alternatively,
32Interestingly, the (conditional) correlation between life expectancy and income per capita in the period 1960-
2000 appears to be twice as large as that during our base sample period (1.70 versus 0.73). This is consistent
with the fact that a large part of the variation in life expectancy during our base sample period is exogenous,
driven by the international epidemiological transition, so the upward bias in the OLS estimate resulting from
r e v e r s ec a u s a l i t ya n dc o m m o ns h o c k st oi n c o m ep e rc a p i t aa n dh e a l t hs h o u l dh a v el e s se ﬀect during the 1940-80
period than during 1960-2000.
16as emphasized by demographers, it may be that the increase in income raises life expectancy.
While Panels A and B show a positive relationship between life expectancy and total
income, the rest of Table 3 suggests that the positive eﬀect on population size outweighs the
increase in GDP; the net eﬀect on GDP per capita, though typically not signiﬁcant, is generally
negative. There is no evidence of a positive eﬀect of life expectancy on GDP per capita in
Table 3. Nevertheless, since these estimates are not necessarily causal, the true eﬀect of life
expectancy on income per capita might be larger or smaller than those shown in Table 3.33
The rest of the paper investigates this question.
5 Predicted Mortality and First Stages
5.1 The Predicted Mortality Instrument
Prior to the international epidemiological transition, there was considerable variation in the
prevalence of diseases across the world. For example, during the 1940s, while malaria was
endemic in parts of South Asia and Central America, it was relatively rare in much of Western
Europe and in the Southern Cone of Latin America. We therefore expect variation in the
eﬀects of global interventions on life expectancy in diﬀerent countries depending on the baseline
distribution of diseases. For example, DDT should reduce malarial infections and mortality,
and increase life expectancy, in Central America and South Asia relative to Western Europe
or the Southern Cone of Latin America.





((1 − ∆dt)Mdi40 + ∆dtMdFt), (12)
where Mdit denotes mortality in country i from disease d at time t, ∆dt is a dummy for
intervention for disease d at time t (it is equal to 1 for all dates after the intervention), and D
includes the 15 diseases listed above. It is measured as the number of deaths per 100 individuals
per annum. Mdi40 refers to the pre-intervention mortality from this disease in the same units,
while MdFt is the mortality rate from disease d at the health frontier of the world at time t.
In our baseline instrument, we take MdFt to be equal to zero.34 Predicted mortality, MI
it,t h u s
uses a country’s pre-intervention (1940) mortality rate from the 15 diseases until there is a
33I f ,i n s t e a d ,w ee s t i m a t eav e r s i o no fe q u a t i o n( 7 )o rt h eg r o w t hr e g r e s s i o ni nf o o t n o t e3 1without country
dummies, we obtain a strong positive association between life expectancy and income per capita or growth as
in many previous studies (e.g., Bloom and Sachs, 1998, Gallup and Sachs, 2001), though as noted above this
association is not informative about the causal relationship between life expectancy and income per capita or
economic growth.
34We also calculated an alternative measure of predicted mortality using the average mortality rate from
disease d at time t among the richest countries, but since these rates are close to zero, this alternative measure
is very similar to our baseline predicted mortality series, and gives identical results.
17global intervention, and after the global intervention, the mortality rate from the disease in
question declines to the frontier mortality rate.
Equation (12) makes it clear that the only source of variation in predicted mortality comes
from the interaction of the baseline distribution of diseases with global interventions (in par-
ticular, note that Mdi40 applies until the time of global intervention). Whether a country has
successfully eradicated a disease or has been quick at adopting international technologies will
have no eﬀect on MI
it; the dummy ∆dt turns on for all countries at the same time. This makes
our exclusion restriction, that Cov(MI
it,ε it+k) = 0, plausible (where recall that εit+k is the
error term in the second stage equation, (7)). Since variations in MI
it are unrelated to any
actions or economic events in the country, there is no obvious reason for it to be correlated
with economic or population shocks in the country in question. The only potential threat to
the exclusion restriction would be that the baseline mortality rates, the Mdi40’s, are correlated
with future changes in population or income. To show that this is unlikely to be the case, we
allow for diﬀerential trends by a range of baseline characteristics and also report results from
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent falsiﬁcation exercises.
5.2 Alternative Instruments
We construct a number of alternative instruments to investigate the robustness of our results.








where Mdi40 denotes mortality in country i from disease d in 1940, Mdt (Md40)i sg l o b a l
mortality from disease d in year t (1940), calculated as the unweighted average across countries
in our sample. The advantage of the global mortality instrument is that it does not use any
information on global intervention dates, instead relying on aggregate changes in world-wide
disease-speciﬁc mortality rates. It is therefore useful in showing that none of our results depend
on the coding of intervention dates.
Second, to further investigate the importance of intervention dates, we construct an alter-
native instrument, which uses diﬀerent timings of interventions whenever there is any potential
doubt about the exact dates. The details of this instrument are discussed in Appendix B.
Finally, we create yet an alternative predicted mortality series using only the three big
killers, malaria, tuberculosis and pneumonia (inﬂuenza is left out of this list, because our
sources do not separate deaths from viral inﬂuenza and the timing of the key intervention for
inﬂuenza is less clear-cut than the other three cases).
We check the robustness of our results using these alternative instruments and in all cases,
the results are very close to those with the baseline instrument.
185.3 Zeroth-Stage Estimates
Our approach is predicated on the notion that global interventions reduce mortality from vari-
ous diseases. Therefore, before documenting the ﬁrst-stage relationship between our predicted
mortality measure and log life expectancy, we show the eﬀect of various global interventions
on mortality from speciﬁc diseases. In this exercise, in addition to the 15 diseases above, we
also use deaths from cancers and malignant tumors as control diseases, since these were not
aﬀected by the global interventions.
Panel A of Table 4 estimates the following “zeroth-stage regression”:
Midt = θ∆dt + µt + πd + δi + vit. (14)
The dependent variable is mortality in country i from disease d at time t, and the regression
includes a full set of time, disease, and country dummies. The coeﬃcient of interest, θ,m e a s u r e s
whether there is a decline in mortality from a speciﬁc disease associated with an intervention.
Table 4 reports estimates of equation (14). In all cases, as expected, the estimate of θ
is negative and signiﬁcant. For example, in column 1, θ is estimated to be -46.04 (standard
error = 9.40), which indicates an average reduction of 46 deaths per 100,000 population per
intervention. In column 2, when we add lagged intervention, the coeﬃcient on the intervention
dummy is largely unchanged (-43.33), while the lagged intervention itself is insigniﬁcant.
More challenging is the speciﬁcation in column 3, which includes contemporaneous and
lead interventions. This speciﬁcation is useful both as a check for pre-existing trends and for
whether the dates of the interventions are coded correctly. Reassuringly, the estimate of the
negative coeﬃcient on contemporaneous intervention, θ, is unaﬀected, while lead intervention
has the opposite (positive) sign (perhaps reﬂecting the lower quality of the pre-1940 data on
individual disease mortality). These results show that mortality from speciﬁc diseases around
the world fell sharply following the global health interventions.
Columns 4-7 investigate whether one of the main diseases is responsible for the results
in columns 1-3, by excluding tuberculosis, pneumonia, malaria, and inﬂuenza one at a time.
Without tuberculosis or pneumonia, the coeﬃcient estimates are somewhat smaller, but still
highly signiﬁcant (-33.93 and -36.31, with standard errors of 8.66 and 8.99, respectively).
Without malaria or inﬂuenza, the coeﬃcient estimates are very similar to the baseline.
In Panel B, we look at each disease separately. The estimates in this case show how
eﬀective interventions have been in reducing mortality from each speciﬁc disease and also give
an indication of how important mortality rates from diﬀerent diseases were. For example, the
coeﬃcient of -108.51 for tuberculosis in column 4 and -137.92 for pneumonia in column 5 show
the large declines in tuberculosis and pneumonia mortality resulting from the introduction
of antibiotics. The estimate of -19.97 in column 6 shows a signiﬁcant decline in malaria
19mortality, but the lower magnitude of this number indicates that mortality from malaria was
less important for our entire sample than mortality from tuberculosis or pneumonia (partly
because large areas of the world were not aﬀected by malaria). The declines in mortality
from the other diseases are even smaller, but with the exception of inﬂuenza and measles (not
shown), they are always statistically signiﬁcant.
5.4 First-Stage Estimates
We next turn to the ﬁrst-stage relationship between life expectancy and predicted mortality.
While the zeroth-stage regression in equation (14) is at the disease-country-time level, our
ﬁrst-stage relationship is at the country-time level, since the left-hand side variable is life
expectancy (at birth).
Figure 3 shows the ﬁrst-stage relationship visually. The horizontal axis is the change in
predicted mortality between 1940 and 1980, while the vertical axis is the change in log life
expectancy during the same time period. We focus on the 1940-1980 period, since 1940 repre-
sents a pre-intervention year and 1980 is the end of the sample for most of our speciﬁcations.
A strong negative relationship is clearly visible in Figure 3. Predicted mortality declined by
a large amount in India, the Philippines, Indonesia, and parts of Central America, while re-
maining largely unchanged in parts of Western Europe, Uruguay, Argentina, Korea, Australia,
and New Zealand. Life expectancy, in turn, increases by a large amount in the ﬁrst group of
countries, and much less in the second group.
Figure 4 depicts that the same relationship without the richest countries. It shows that
the ﬁrst-stage relationship is not driven by the comparison of rich countries to middle and
low-income countries.
Table 5 shows the ﬁrst-stage relationship in regression form by estimating equation (8).
Country and year dummies are again included, and this set of speciﬁcations does not include
any covariates. The top panel uses our entire data starting from either 1940 or 1930, while the
bottom panel reports the long-diﬀerence speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst column is our baseline speciﬁcation. It shows an estimate of ψ equal to -0.33 with
a standard error of 0.06, which is signiﬁcant at less than 1%.35 This estimate implies that an
improvement in predicted mortality of 0.43 (per 100 or 430 per 100,000 p.a., which is the mean
improvement between 1940 and 1950 in our base sample) leads approximately to a 13 percent
increase in life expectancy (mean life expectancy in our sample in 1940 was 49.30, so this is
an increase of about 6.5 years, while the actual mean improvement in life expectancy between
1940 and 1950 was 5.3 years). With long diﬀerences, the coeﬃcient estimate is -0.44, which is
35Note that the t-statistics in the basic ﬁrst-stage relationships are above 5, so there is no issue of weak
instruments (see, for example, Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). Hence, in the 2SLS regressions below we use
the standard Wald conﬁdence intervals.
20somewhat larger, but also slightly less precisely estimated (standard error = 0.09).
Results are similar for 1930-1980 in column 2 (and also for 1940-1970 or 1930-1970–not
reported in the table). Column 3 shows analogous results when we include Eastern Europe.
Column 4 excludes the initially rich countries and shows a statistically signiﬁcant (though
smaller) estimate of ψ (e.g., -0.23 with a standard error of 0.08 in Panel A).
Our baseline sample consists of an unbalanced panel. Column 5 shows that limiting the
sample to a balanced panel makes little diﬀerence. The estimate of ψ is now -0.32 (standard
error = 0.06).
Columns 6-8 investigate the robustness of the ﬁrst stage to the inclusion of a range of inter-
actions between country-speciﬁc variables and time dummies; these speciﬁcations are therefore
similar to equation (10) above, except that they include interactions with initial values of insti-
tutions, log GDP per capita and continent dummies. For example, column 6 allows countries
with diﬀerent institutions (as measured by average constraint on the executive, from the Polity
IV dataset, in 1950, 1960, and 1970) to have diﬀerent changes in life expectancy in every year.
This has little eﬀect on the baseline estimates, which are now -0.27 (standard error = 0.07)
in Panel A and -0.35 (standard error = 0.09) in Panel B. Column 7 includes interactions with
initial (1930) log GDP per capita, ﬂexibly allowing for diﬀerential trends in life expectancy
for countries starting with diﬀerent levels of prosperity. This also has very little eﬀect on the
estimates. Column 8 includes a full set of interactions between continent dummies and life
expectancy, to control for the potential diﬀerential impact of distinct disease environments on
the evolution of life expectancy. Once again, this has very little eﬀect on the estimates, which
remain highly signiﬁcant and very close to the baseline.
Columns 9—12 investigate robustness to alternative instruments. Columns 9 and 10 use the
global mortality instrument for the base sample and for the sample including only initially low
and middle-income countries. The estimates are slightly larger and more signiﬁcant.36 For
example, in Panel A the estimate of ψ is -0.41 (standard error = 0.08). Column 11 uses the
alternative timing of global interventions as described in Appendix B, again with very similar
estimates. These results show that the exact coding of global interventions and whether we
use aggregate trends in disease-speciﬁc mortality or information on global interventions have
little eﬀect on the ﬁrst-stage relationship. Finally, column 12 shows very similar results when
the instrument uses information from only tuberculosis, malaria and pneumonia.
Overall, the results in Table 5 show a large and robust eﬀect of the predicted mortality
instrument on life expectancy. We next investigate the robustness of these results further.
36T h ee x c e p t i o ni sc o l u m n1 0i nP a n e lB ,w h e r et h ee s t i m a t ei ss i g n i ﬁcant only at 10%.
215.5 Further Robustness Checks
Appendix Table C1 investigates the importance of disease composition to see whether a speciﬁc
disease is responsible for the ﬁrst-stage relationships shown in Figures 4 and 5 and in Table 5.37
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of this table present results dropping data on the three main killers from
our predicted mortality measure: tuberculosis, malaria and pneumonia respectively. Dropping
tuberculosis or pneumonia strengthens the ﬁrst stage estimates slightly, while none of the other
diseases has a signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient. We conclude from these results
that the ﬁrst-stage relationship does not reﬂect the impact of any single disease.
The speciﬁcations in Table 5 do not allow for mean reversion in life expectancy, and also
assume that it is contemporaneous predicted mortality that aﬀects life expectancy. Failure to
correctly specify the mean-reverting dynamics in life expectancy may bias our results. More-
over, in more general speciﬁcations we may ﬁnd that it is lags or leads of predicted mortality
that aﬀect life expectancy. In particular, if it is the leads of (future changes in) predicted mor-
tality that aﬀect life expectancy, this would shed doubt on our interpretation of the ﬁrst-stage
relationship. Table 6 investigates these issues. Column 1 repeats our baseline speciﬁcation
(from column 1 of Table 5). Column 2 reports OLS estimates from the following model:
xit = νxit−1 + ψMI
it + δ0
i + µ0
t + uit, (15)
which allows lagged log life expectancy to aﬀect current log life expectancy. There is indeed
evidence for mean reversion; the coeﬃcient ν in the top panel is estimated to be 0.44 (standard
error = 0.09). Nevertheless, the negative relationship between predicted mortality and life
expectancy remains. The parameter of interest, ψ, is now estimated at -0.18 (standard error =
0.08), and implies a long-run impact similar to that in our baseline speciﬁcation (the long-run
impact in this case is 0.18/(1 − 0.44) ≈ 0.32).
Because we have a relatively short panel, OLS estimation of (15) will lead to inconsistent
estimates. To deal with this problem, we follow the method of Anderson and Hsiao (1992) in
column 3. This involves ﬁrst-diﬀerencing (15), to obtain:
∆xit = ν∆xit−1 + ψ∆MI
it + ∆µ0
t + ∆uit,
where the ﬁxed country eﬀects are removed by diﬀerencing. Although this equation cannot be
estimated consistently by OLS either, in the absence of serial correlation in the original residual,
uit, there will be no second order serial correlation in ∆uit,s oxit−2 will be uncorrelated with
∆uit and can be used as instrument for ∆xit−1 to obtain consistent estimates. Similarly MI
it−1
is used as an instrument for ∆MI
it. This procedure leads to very similar results to the OLS
estimates. The estimate of ψ is -0.27 (standard error = 0.14).
37Appendix Tables C1-C4 are included in Appendix C and are not for publication.
22Although the instrumental variable estimator of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) leads to con-
sistent estimates, it is not eﬃcient, since, under the assumption of no serial correlation in uit,
not only xit−2, but all earlier lags of xit in the sample are also uncorrelated with ∆uit,a n d
can also be used as additional instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a Generalized
Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator using all of these moment conditions. When all these
moment conditions are valid, this GMM estimator is more eﬃcient than Anderson and Hsiao’s
(1982) estimator. GMM estimation, which we use in column 4, leads to similar but more
precisely estimated coeﬃcients. The estimate of ψ in the full sample is now -0.19 (standard
error = 0.06). Tests for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals, reported at the bottom
of the column, show that there is no evidence of additional serial correlation. However, the
Hansen J-test shows that the overidentiﬁcation restrictions are rejected, presumably because
diﬀerent lags of life expectancy lead to diﬀerent estimates of the mean reversion coeﬃcient.
This rejection is not a major concern for our empirical strategy since the exact magnitude of
the mean reversion coeﬃcient, ν, is not of direct interest to us. Essentially because the models
in (8) and (15) are the ﬁrst stage in our 2SLS procedure, all we need is for MI
it−1 not to have
a direct eﬀect on the second-stage outcomes.
Columns 5-7 investigate the eﬀect of lagged and lead mortality. In column 5, contem-
poraneous and lagged mortality are included together. Not surprisingly, both of these are
signiﬁcant, since, in many countries, global health interventions were implemented gradually
over time (recall that an intervention is coded at the time of the major global breakthrough).
The more important challenge for our approach is the inclusion of lead predicted mortality.
Since global interventions did not start before 1940, lead mortality should have no eﬀect on
life expectancy. Column 6 investigates this by including contemporaneous and lead mortality
together. In this case, the estimate of the eﬀect of contemporaneous predicted mortality is
-0.33 (standard error = 0.06), while lead mortality is not signiﬁcant and has the wrong sign.
Column 7 includes contemporaneous, lag, and lead predicted mortality together, and in this
case both contemporaneous and lag mortality are statistically signiﬁcant, while lead mortality
remains highly insigniﬁcant. These results suggest that, consistent with our hypothesis, it was
indeed the global interventions of the 1940s onwards that led to the increase in life expectancy
in countries previously aﬀected by these diseases.
Finally, columns 8 and 9 shows that controlling for the eﬀect of income per capita has little
impact on the relationship between predicted mortality and life expectancy, and column 10
shows very similar to our baseline estimates from the balanced panel of countries.
235.6 Pre-Existing Trends and Falsiﬁcation
Table 6 already showed that life expectancy responds to contemporaneous changes in predicted
mortality and does not respond to future changes. This suggests that our ﬁrst stage is unlikely
to be driven by pre-existing trends. Nevertheless, the exercise in Table 6 uses only data from
1940 onwards. An alternative falsiﬁcation exercise on pre-existing trends is to look at changes
in life expectancy during the pre-period, 1900-1940, and see whether they correlate with future
(post-1940) changes in predicted mortality. This is done in Figures 5 through 8 and in Table
7.
Figure 5 shows the change in log life expectancy 1900-1940 against the change in predicted
mortality 1940-1980. There is no evidence of a negative relationship similar to those in Figures
3 and 4. In fact, there is a slight positive slope (which is statistically insigniﬁcant–see Table
7). Figure 6 shows the same relationship without the richest countries, and there is now a
somewhat stronger positive relationship (again insigniﬁcant–see Table 7). There is thus no
evidence of pre-existing trends that could explain our ﬁrst-stage results.
Figures 7 and 8 substantiate the patterns in Figures 5 and 6 further by showing changes
in log life expectancy just before the international epidemiological transition, between 1930
and 1940 against the predicted mortality instrument. These ﬁgures also show no evidence of
as i g n i ﬁcant negative relationship either for the whole sample or for the subsample excluding
the initially richest countries. Our measure of predicted mortality explains changes in life
expectancy after 1940 but not before 1940.
Table 7 also extends our examination of potential pre-existing trends to the outcome mea-
sures, by looking for a potential relationship between our measure of post-1940 predicted
mortality and changes in log population, log GDP, and log GDP per capita between 1900 and
1940.38 Columns 1 and 2 conﬁr mt h ep o s i t i v ea n di n s i g n i ﬁcant relationship between change in
predicted mortality between 1940 and 1980 and change in life expectancy between 1900 and
1940 shown in Figures 5 and 6. Columns 3 and 4 show that there are no diﬀerential pre-existing
trends in log population between 1900 and 1940 either for the entire sample or for the sample
excluding the richest countries. Columns 5-8 show similar results for log GDP and log GDP
per capita.
These results therefore indicate that there were no pre-existing trends in life expectancy or
in our key outcome variables prior to the international epidemiological transition.39 This gives
us greater conﬁdence in using predicted mortality as an instrument to investigate the eﬀect of
38We do not have enough data to do this for total births. Data limitations also make our sample sizes for the
other variables smaller for this exercise than for our main regressions.
39For a more qualitative conﬁrmation that there was no pre-existing trend, see Carr-Saunders (1936). In this
comprehensive review of population trends, there is no hint of the increase in life expectancy and population
that was to occur shortly.
24life expectancy on a range of economic outcomes.
Finally, we further use Table 7 to show the reduced-form relationships between predicted
mortality and some of our outcome variables. Recall that life expectancy is a proxy for overall
health of the population, so the reduced-form relationships between predicted mortality and
the outcome variables are as informative as the 2SLS estimates reported below. Panel B
of Table 7 shows these reduced-form relationships. As already shown, there is a signiﬁcant
negative relationship between life expectancy and predicted mortality in the period 1940-
80. In addition, there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between predicted mortality and
population during the same period, which indicates an increase in population in previously
high-mortality areas resulting from the international epidemiological transition. The other
columns show a negative but insigniﬁcant relationship between predicted mortality and total
GDP, and a positive relationship between predicted mortality and GDP per capita. These
results imply that declines in mortality were associated with lower GDP per capita (since total
GDP did not increase much and population grew substantially). The 2SLS estimates presented
in the next section conﬁrm these reduced-form relationships.
6M a i n R e s u l t s
We now present our main results, which are the 2SLS (two-stage least square) estimates of
the eﬀect of log life expectancy on six outcome variables: log population, log total births, log
GDP, log GDP per capita, log GDP per working age population, and years of schooling.
For each outcome we use two estimation strategies. The ﬁrst is a full panel with decadal
observations between 1940 and 1980, while the second looks only at the long diﬀerence using
data from 1940 and 1980. The tables have a parallel structure (except for schooling, where data
availability makes this impossible). In addition, in each case, we look both for contemporaneous
eﬀects and for “longer-run” eﬀects after 10, 20, 30, and 40 years.
6.1 Population
Figure 9 shows a strong negative reduced-form relationship between change in log population
1940-80 and the change in predicted mortality over the same period. This pattern, already
seen in Panel B of Table 7, implies that countries with a larger decline in predicted mortality
experienced a larger increase in log population, i.e., more population growth. Given the neg-
ative relationship between predicted mortality and life expectancy in Figure 4, this translates
into a positive eﬀect of life expectancy on population. This is conﬁrmed in Table 8, which
reports 2SLS results from regressing log population on log life expectancy in either a panel
speciﬁcation (Panel A) or in long diﬀerences (Panel B). The ﬁrst stages for these regressions
are reported in Table 5 and are not repeated here to save space.
25In column 1 we look at contemporaneous eﬀects during 1940-80 and ﬁnd a coeﬃcient on
log life expectancy of 1.31, with a standard error of 0.37 (statistically signiﬁcant at 1%). This
estimate is comparable to the OLS estimates in Table 2.
The coeﬃcient increases to 1.35 when we look at 1930-80 (column 2) and is even larger
when we include Eastern Europe (column 3). When we exclude the initially richest countries
in column 4, the coeﬃcient estimate is again similar, 1.58 (standard error = 0.76).
Column 5 shows that the results are generally robust (though slightly smaller) when we
include the full set of interactions between year dummies and institutions (both in the ﬁrst and
second stages).40 These interactions are jointly signiﬁcant, suggesting that initial institutional
diﬀerences have some predictive power for subsequent population growth. Column 6 estimates
equation (10), allowing for a full set of interactions between year dummies and initial (1930)
log population. As noted above, this speciﬁcation ﬂexibly controls for both mean reversion and
potential diﬀerential trends. Remarkably, the estimate of the eﬀect of log life expectancy on log
population is essentially unaﬀected, 1.33 (standard error = 0.35), though interactions between
year dummies and initial population are jointly statistically signiﬁcant. The corresponding
estimate in Panel B is also very similar to the baseline, 1.68 (standard error = 0.44).
Column 7 repeats the baseline regression using the global mortality instrument. In Panel
A ,t h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ee ﬀect of log life expectancy on log population is 1.65 (standard error =
0.40), while in Panel B, it is 1.70 (standard error = 0.48).
Columns 8-11 investigate the longer-term eﬀects of life expectancy on population growth
by looking at the speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is various leads of log population
(i.e., k>0 in terms of equation (7)). The coeﬃcients are on the whole very similar to the
baseline estimate (slightly higher for 10 and 20 year leads and slightly smaller for the 40 year
lead). This suggests that changes in life expectancy led to relatively enduring increases in
population. Panel B shows the same results with the long diﬀerence speciﬁcations.
Overall, we ﬁnd a large, relatively precise, and robust eﬀect of life expectancy on population.
The elasticity is estimated consistently to lie between 1 and 2, which is similar to the OLS
estimates.
6.2 Births
Table 9 presents 2SLS estimates of log life expectancy on log total births. Consistent with the
magnitude of the response of population to life expectancy, Table 9 indicates that the increase
in life expectancy was associated with an increase in the total number of births. In column 1,
Panel A, the estimate is 2.39 (standard error = 0.69). The estimates are similar in the long-
diﬀerence speciﬁcations, when we include Eastern Europe, when we exclude the initially richest
40The results including the interactions between year dummies and initial log GDP per capita or continent
dummies are also very similar and are not reported to save space.
26countries, when we include interactions between year dummies and institutions, or initial log
GDP per capita, continent dummies, and initial log total births, and when we use the global
mortality instrument.
Looking at the leads shows an interesting pattern whereby the eﬀects become smaller at
future dates. This suggests that there was a delayed decline in fertility in response to the
increase in life expectancy (which is consistent with the evidence reviewed in Kelley, 1988).
6.3 GDP
Figure 10 shows the reduced-form relationship between change in log (total) GDP and change
in predicted mortality during 1940-1980. Consistent with the pattern in Panel B of Table 7,
there is a slight (but not statistically signiﬁcant) downward slope, which indicates that countries
with larger declines in predicted mortality experienced somewhat higher GDP growth between
1940 and 1980, though this eﬀect is not very large.
Table 10 presents the related 2SLS regression evidence. In column 1, the estimate of the
key parameter is -0.03 (standard error = 0.67). The estimate using long diﬀerences in Panel
B (corresponding to Figure 10) is positive, 0.32, but also statistically insigniﬁcant (standard
error = 0.84). In both cases, the standard errors are large enough that economically signiﬁcant
positive eﬀects cannot be ruled out. For example, the two standard error (95% conﬁdence)
intervals always include a response of GDP to life expectancy with an elasticity that could be
as high as 1.3. Nevertheless, the standard errors will be somewhat smaller when we look at
GDP per capita below, enabling us to exclude any positive eﬀects on per capita growth.
The pattern of response of GDP to life expectancy is broadly similar when we look at dif-
ferent sample periods, when we include Eastern Europe, exclude the initially richest countries,
when we include interactions between year dummies and institutions or initial GDP per capita,
a n dw h e nw eu s et h eg l o b a lm o r t a l i t yi n s t r u m e n t .
The estimates in columns 8-11 show that at longer horizons there is a more positive eﬀect
of life expectancy on GDP (though still not signiﬁcant). For example, with the 10-year lead the
coeﬃcient is now 0.52 (standard error = 0.48) and with the 20-year lead it is 0.53 (standard
error = 0.44). The eﬀect starts declining after the 30-year lead. Estimates using the long
diﬀerences are close to and somewhat larger (though considerably less precise) than the panel
estimates in Panel A. The over-time increase in the impact of life expectancy on GDP could be
a result of a combination of the larger population reaching working age, and consistent with
the neoclassical growth model, capital inputs and other factors of production adjusting to the
increase in population.
We interpret these estimates as suggesting that the increase in life expectancy and the
associated increase in population had a relatively small eﬀect on total GDP at ﬁrst, with a
27somewhat larger eﬀect over time. Nevertheless, the relatively large standard errors make it
impossible for us to pin down the exact magnitude or timing of the impact of life expectancy
on total GDP.
6.4 GDP Per Capita and Per Working Age Population
The response of total GDP already reveals that the eﬀect of the increase in life expectancy
on GDP per capita (or GDP per working age population) was negative. This is shown in
Figure 11, which depicts a strong positive reduced-form relationship between the change in log
GDP per capita and the change in predicted mortality during 1940-1980. Evidently, countries
with larger declines in predicted mortality also experienced lower growth in GDP per capita.
Clearly, this is the result of the larger increase in population than in GDP in these countries,
which was already shown in Figures 11 and 12 and in Panel B of Table 7.
The 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of log life expectancy on GDP per capita in Table 11
conﬁrm this pattern. There is a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of life expectancy on GDP per
capita in columns 1 and 2 of Panels A and B. In either case, the coeﬃcient estimate for π in
equation (7) is around -1.30 (with standard errors ranging between 0.46 and 0.61).
The results in columns 3-6, which look at alternative samples and include interactions with
initial institutions and initial log GDP per capita, are similarly negative and hover around
statistical signiﬁcance. Estimates from equation (10) in column 7, on the other hand, lead to
still negative but smaller eﬀects of log life expectancy on GDP per capita. In all cases, the two
standard error bands always exclude positive eﬀects of life expectancy on GDP per capita.
As with the results for total GDP in Table 10, the lead results indicate a more positive (less
negative) impact of life expectancy on GDP per capita over the following 40 years than initially.
Nevertheless, even after 40 years, there is no evidence of a positive eﬀect of life expectancy on
GDP per capita.
One concern with these results is that the increase in population is largely at young ages,
so GDP per capita may be low precisely because the denominator has increased, while the
working age population has not. To investigate the importance of this issue, Appendix Table
C2 looks at GDP per working age population,41 and shows that the impact of life expectancy
on GDP per working age population is very similar to its impact on GDP per capita.
Overall, our 2SLS estimates show no evidence that the large increase in life expectancy in
many parts of the world starting in the 1940s led to a signiﬁcant increase in GDP per capita.42
Instead, the increase in life expectancy was associated with a signiﬁcant increase in population
41We deﬁne working age population as population between the ages of 15 and 60. Estimates of the age
distribution of the population and hence of the working age population for this time period are often rough.
42As noted in footnote 40, the results are similar when we control for a full set of continent dummies interacted
with time. For example, in the speciﬁcation of Table 11, the coeﬃcient on log life expectancy is -0.27 (standard
error = 0.45).
28and a somewhat smaller increase in total GDP.
These results are broadly consistent with the neoclassical growth model. In terms of the
model in Section 2, suppose that the contemporaneous eﬀects correspond to the “medium
run” impact with the capital stock held constant. The coeﬃcient of interest, in this case,
is π =( α(γ + η) − (1 − α)λ) in terms of equation (6). Recall that λ here is the response of
population to changes in life expectancy, so according to the estimates in Table 8, we can think
of λ ≈ 1.5. The coeﬃcient α corresponds to the share of labor. Since the countries in question
here include many low-income countries where land is an important factor of production, we
take the share of land as 1/3, i.e., 1 − α − β ≈ 1/3 (see footnote 13), and thus set α ≈ 1/3
and β ≈ 1/3. This would imply that our estimate of π =( α(γ + η) − (1 − α)λ) ≈− 1.3
is consistent with γ + η close to zero or even slightly negative. If, on the other hand, we
were to take λ to be around 1.7 as suggested by the high-end estimates in Table 8, γ + η
would be small but positive.43 Therefore, these results suggest that the beneﬁts of higher
life expectancy in terms of direct productivity gains and human capital gains are relatively
small. This is also conﬁrmed when we look at the longer-run eﬀects. For example, if we take
the long-run eﬀect to be approximately -0.75 and β ≈ 1/3, then the long-run relationship
of π =( α(γ + η) − (1 − α − β)λ)/(1 − β)i m p l i e sav a l u eo fγ + η equal to zero. Smaller
negative eﬀects, which are within the two standard error bands of the estimates in Table 11,
would be consistent with positive values of γ + η.44
6.5 Years of Schooling
The results so far do not show any evidence of large gains from increases in life expectancy
in terms of economic growth per capita. Instead, the greater population associated with the
increase in life expectancy appears to have somewhat reduced income per capita. This suggests
that the indirect beneﬁts of improved health in terms of greater education and greater (total
factor) productivity may be limited (see the calculations in the last paragraph of the previous
subsection). As a further check on this conclusion and as a way of investigating whether there
are any substantial eﬀects of life expectancy working through human capital (as posited by
equation (4)), we can also directly look at whether increasing life expectancy raised human
capital during and in the aftermath of the international epidemiological transition.
Table 12 estimates the corresponding 2SLS regressions using the available data on schooling
starting in 1960. Data availability implies that we can only look at the eﬀect of life expectancy
43But in turn, if α were higher, the implied values of γ + η would be correspondingly lower. For example,
Hansen and Prescott (2002) suggest a value of 0.3 for 1−α−β,0 . 1f o rβ and 0.6 for α in pre-industrial societies.
44The comparison of these results to the OLS estimates in Table 3 (together with the pattern discussed in
footnote 32) suggests that the lack of a signiﬁcant OLS relationship between life expectancy and GDP per capita
is likely to be due to a combination of a short-run negative eﬀect of life expectancy on GDP per capita and a
positive eﬀect of income on life expectancy. See also Pritchett and Summers (1998) for estimates of income per
capita on life expectancy.
29on 10-year or 20-year leads of schooling (which is not a severe limitation since there are likely
to be important lags in the eﬀect of life expectancy on schooling). The results in Table 12 show
that there is no eﬀect of life expectancy on schooling in the OLS and in the IV either in the
base sample or for only low and middle-income countries (columns 1-6). With 30-year leads,
there is a positive and signiﬁcant OLS estimate, but the IV estimates are again insigniﬁcant
(either positive or negative depending on the sample, as shown in columns 8 and 9).
Overall, there seems to be no evidence that the increase in life expectancy has been as-
sociated with substantially greater investment in human capital, which is consistent with the
ﬁnding in the previous subsection. The most likely reason why the increase in life expectancy
did not translate into greater education during this episode is that the aﬀected countries faced
bottlenecks in their education systems, making it impossible for them to increase the edu-
cation of the much larger cohorts of children that survived and were born as a result of the
international epidemiological transition.
7F u r t h e r R e s u l t s
The results in the previous section suggest that the increase in life expectancy led to a sub-
stantial increase in population, but not to more rapid economic growth. In this section, we
investigate the robustness of these results further.
7.1 Alternative Samples
An important question is whether including sub-Saharan Africa in the analysis changes any of
the main results documented above. This is hard to answer with great certainty as the detailed
data for Africa before at least 1950 are either not available or not reliable. Although there is
a sizable historical literature on medical conditions in Africa, much of this is not accompanied
by statistics that are comparable with our base sample data.45 Nevertheless, it is possible to
include sub-Saharan Africa after 1950 in our regressions using UN data (which are nonetheless
less reliable than the non-African data, see Appendix C for details). This is done in columns
1-4 and 7-10 of Table 13. The results for the ﬁrst and the second stages are similar to our
previous results both using the baseline and the global mortality instruments.46 In this case,
45In general terms, we know that health in Africa improved, at least for a while after World War II. For
example, Cutler et al (2006, p. 17) write: “life expectancy [in Africa] rose by more than 13 years from the early
1950s to the late 1980s, before declining in the face of HIV/AIDS.” Estimates in Gwatkin (1980, e.g., Figure 2)
also suggest that increases in life expectancy were at least as dramatic in Africa as in other developing countries,
but only until average life expectancy for these societies reached 40; at that point the rate of increase slowed
sharply. This could point to a failure to sustain health improvements or some other factor, and needs further
investigation.
46The sample used here is limited both by lack of life expectancy data in 1940 and by the fact that Maddison
does not have population or GDP data for Africa before 1950. Consequently, even though Table 13 uses
information on 43 more countries than the previous tables, the additional observations are all post-1950.
30estimates using the global mortality instrument are more reliable since they do not use the
baseline disease distributions in Africa.
A second alternative sample drops countries that were demographically most aﬀected by
World War II. Urlanis (2003) documents demographic eﬀects that were both direct, through
loss of population, and indirect, through reducing birth rates and increasing non-casualty death
rates in a number of countries. Interestingly, however, in relatively few cases was there a ﬁrst-
order eﬀect on population. Based on Urlanis (2003), columns 5-6 and 11-12 of Table 13 report
results dropping Germany, Italy, Finland, Austria, and China (Japan is not in our sample
due to data issues; Eastern Europe is not in the baseline sample). The ﬁrst-stage relationship
between log life expectancy and predicted mortality remains strong and highly signiﬁcant, and
there is again a large eﬀect on population and a smaller, insigniﬁcant eﬀect on total GDP.
We also estimated regressions dropping countries that were involved in developing the
new “miracle” drugs and chemicals of the 1940s and 1950s: the UK, the US, Germany and
Switzerland. For these countries one might be concerned that the medical innovations were
partly endogoneous to their disease conditions. In any case, this has hardly any eﬀect on the
estimates (not reported).
7.2 Mean Reversion in the Second Stage
In Appendix Table C3, for our main variable of interest, income per capita, we estimate a
version of equation (9), which explicitly allows for mean reversion in the dependent variable.
Recall that the presence of such mean reversion does not aﬀect the consistency of the esti-
mates presented so far as long as our instrument for life expectancy is valid (i.e., as long as
Cov(MI
it,ε it+k) = 0), so we report these estimates mostly for completeness.
Our strategy is to estimate a transformed model that removes the eﬀect of mean reversion
in income per capita. Suppose we know the mean-reversion parameter ρ in equation (9). Then,
subtract ρyit−1 from yit, which, using (9) without covariates, gives
˜ y
ρ









where the transformed dependent variable is ˜ y
ρ
it ≡ yit − ρyit−1, and on the right hand side we
have ˜ x
ρ
it ≡ xit−ρxit−1 (and ˜ ε
ρ
it ≡ εit−ρεit−1). MI




it,ε it+k) = 0 for all k,w ea l s oh a v eC o v ( MI
it,ε
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it) = 0). Therefore, a 2SLS
regression of ˜ y
ρ
it on ˜ x
ρ
it will identify the coeﬃcient of interest, π. Although we do not know ρ,w e
can implement a two-stage version of this procedure by ﬁrst estimating ρ.47 Appendix Table
C3 reports results from applying this procedure using a range of values for ρ that encompasses
(and exceeds) the range of estimates of ρ. There is a robust ﬁrst stage between transformed
47In regressions of log income per capi t ao ni t sl a ga n dc o u n t r ya n dt i m eﬁxed eﬀects, the estimates of ρ vary
between 0.4 and 0.75 depending on estimation strategy and on whether or not log life expectancy is included.
31log life expectancy and predicted mortality, and the second-stage estimates are similar to (but
somewhat more negative than) those in Table 11. These estimates show that irrespective of
the value of ρ, the relationship between life expectancy and GDP per capita is never positive
(the point estimate is always negative).
7.3 Interaction Results
As discussed in Section 2, we may expect the impact of log life expectancy on GDP per capita
to diﬀer depending on the investment rate. We investigate this issue in Appendix Table C4
using two variables to measure investment rates: (1) initial (1930) log GDP per capita and (2)
investment rates from the 1940s (or immediately after). Although income diﬀerences in 1930
likely had various causes, we expect them to be correlated with savings and investment rates,
and these data are likely to be more reliable than estimates of investment rates around the
same time.
Our empirical strategy is to include an interaction between log life expectancy and initial
log GDP per capita or investment as a percent of GDP. This interaction term is instrumented
by the interaction between predicted mortality and initial log GDP per capita (or investment).
In all regressions, the main eﬀects are evaluated at the sample mean. Panel A of Appendix
Table C4 shows that the eﬀect of log life expectancy on population is the same irrespective of
initial log GDP p.c. or the investment rate; the interactions between log life expectancy and
these baseline characteristics are insigniﬁcant both in contemporaneous and lead speciﬁcations.
The picture is diﬀerent in Panels B and C, where we look at log GDP and log GDP per
capita. In the regressions with contemporaneous eﬀects, the interaction terms both with GDP
per capita in 1930 and investment share of GDP in 1940s are positive, and except for the
eﬀect of the interaction with GDP per capita in 1930 on log total GDP (in Panel B), they
are statistically signiﬁcant. For example, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between GDP per
capita in 1930 and log life expectancy in the log GDP per capita regression (Panel C, column
1) is 0.79 (standard error = 0.37), while the interaction with investment share of GDP for the
same variable (Panel C, column 5) is 0.12 (standard error = 0.04). These estimates imply that,
consistent with our theoretical expectations, there is some evidence that countries with high
investment rates (measured directly or proxied by high initial income per capita) suﬀered less
adverse income eﬀects from the increase in population. Moreover, consistent with equation
(5) in Section 2, these investment rate and life expectancy interactions appear not to have
had a positive impact on log GDP or log GDP per capita in the long run. Nevertheless, the
results of this exercise have to be interpreted with caution, since data quality and relatively
large standard errors limit the extent to which we can pin down the exact timing of changes
in GDP.
328C o n c l u s i o n
A newly-emerging consensus in academic and policy circles holds that disease environment and
health conditions lie at the root of large income diﬀerences across countries today, and argues
that improving health will not only improve lives but will by itself spur rapid economic growth.
This paper investigated these claims by estimating the eﬀect of life expectancy at birth
on economic growth. The innovation in our approach is to exploit the international epidemi-
ological transition, which led to potentially-exogenous diﬀerential changes in mortality from a
number of major diseases across the world. As a result of new chemicals, drugs, and other in-
ternational interventions, mortality from tuberculosis, pneumonia, malaria, and various other
diseases declined sharply in many parts of the world, while other countries that were largely
unaﬀected by these diseases did not experience similar improvements in health and life ex-
pectancy. Exploiting these diﬀerential changes in predicted mortality as an instrument for life
expectancy, we estimate the eﬀect of life expectancy on a range of economic variables, most
importantly population and GDP.
Our results indicate that the increase in life expectancy led to a signiﬁcant increase in pop-
ulation; birth rates did not decline suﬃc i e n t l yt oc o m p e n s a t ef o rt h ei n c r e a s ei nl i f ee x p e c t a n c y .
We ﬁnd a small initial positive eﬀect of life expectancy on total GDP, and this eﬀect grows
somewhat over the next 40 years, but not enough to compensate for the increase in population.
Overall, the increases in life expectancy (and the associated increases in population) appear
to have reduced income per capita at ﬁrst, with this negative eﬀect slowly wearing oﬀ over the
next 40 years. There is no evidence that the increase in life expectancy led to faster growth
of income per capita. This evidence sheds considerable doubt on the view that health has a
ﬁrst-order impact on economic growth.
It is also important to emphasize the limitations of our results. The most important limi-
tation is that since our approach exploits the international epidemiological transition around
the 1940s, the results may not be directly applicable to today’s world. This is for at least two
reasons. First, the international epidemiological transition was a unique event and perhaps
similar changes in life expectancy today will not lead to an increase in population and the
impact on GDP per capita may be more positive. Second, the diseases that take many lives
in the poorer parts of the world today are not the same as those 60 years ago; most notably
HIV/AIDS is a major killer today but was not so in 1940. Most of the diseases we focus on had
the greatest impact on children (with the notable exception of tuberculosis), while HIV/AIDS
aﬀects individuals at the peak of their labor productivity and could have a larger negative im-
pact on growth. Further study of the eﬀects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on economic outcomes
is an important area for future research.
339 Appendix A: Data Sources and Construction
Population, GDP, and GDP per capita data are from Maddison (2003), speciﬁcally the downloadable
data available to purchasers of his 2003 book. Working age population is deﬁned as population be-
tween the ages of 15 and 60 and is obtained from the on-line UN demographic database from 1950
(http://esa.un.org/unpp). Population structure for 1940 is from the UN Demographic Yearbook 1948
(United Nations 1949, Table 4, pp. 108-158). We use data for 1940 or the closest available year or
range of years. For 1930 we assume the same age structure as 1940 (this is relevant only for column 2
of Appendix Table C2).
Life expectancy in 1940 and earlier are from various UN Demographic Yearbooks. Key Yearbooks
are the original 1948 edition (United Nations 1949) and subsequent issues for 1949-50 (United Nations
1950), for 1951 (United Nations 1951), and particularly the retrospective section of the Demographic
Yearbook 1967 (United Nations, 1967). We use the most recently revised UN data available to calculate
the unweighted averages of male and female life expectancy for 1940 (we also check these data against
United Nations, 2000, but the coverage of this generally begins no earlier than 1948). When there is no
data for 1940, but such data exist for neighboring years, e.g., 1938 and 1942, we use linear interpolation
to obtain an estimate for 1940. In a few cases, we use information from neighboring countries when they
have similar crude death rates (from the UN Demographic Yearbooks). Appendix C provides further
details and gives the speciﬁcs for each country.
Life expectancy from 1950 onwards was downloaded from the on-line UN demographic database;
these data are in ﬁve year intervals, so we use 1950-55 for 1950 and 1960-65 for 1960, etc. Life expectancy
in 1900, used in the falsiﬁcation tests, is from Maddison (2001, Table 1-5a, p. 30). These estimates for
life expectancy in 1900 for Europe, Latin America, and Asia are consistent with the numbers in Arriaga
and Davis (1969), Riley (2001), and Bengtsson et al (2004).
To classify the cause of death, we use the Abridged List of the 1938 revision of the International
Classiﬁcation of Disease. This list is comprehensive and has 44 categories. We omit any diseases that
are not infectious or could be degenerative, e.g., “diseases of the heart” (Abridged List No. 24) and
residual categories, such as “other infectious or parasitic diseases” (Abridged List No. 14). Syphilis
(Abridged List No. 9) and puerperal fever/infection (Abridged List No. 35), which results from an
infection after childbirth, are omitted because their prevalence depends on sexual and fertility behavior,
which fall outside our focus here. Finally, we further omit diseases that were never major causes of
death, even though they may have had serious eﬀects on health (e.g., acute poliomyelitis). In all, there
are 15 infectious diseases for which we can obtain comparable cross-country data on deaths per 100,000
in 1940 (or 1939 or a close year). Of these 15, 3 are reviewed in more detail in the main text and 12 are
covered in Appendix B. We have checked that the data we use in or around 1940 are not signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the impact of World War II; this is generally possible as in most cases some combination of
United Nations sources yields numbers for at least two early years. For European countries aﬀected by
the war, we prefer data from 1937 or 1938, where available. Also, in our robustness checks, we drop all
data from countries where Urlanis (2003) deemed that war had a major demographic impact.
The classiﬁcation of death rates by cause changed in 1948, and some of our data for 1950 and after
are available only according to the Abbreviated List, 1948 Revision of the International Classiﬁcation
of Disease. For example, the UN Demographic Yearbook (1954) reports cause of death in and around
1950 for some countries using the 1938 classiﬁcation and for others using the 1948 classiﬁcation. The
terminology of the Abridged List for the 1938 classiﬁcation and the Abbreviated List for the 1948 clas-
siﬁcation is as used in the Demographic Yearbook. Most of our 15 diseases can be tracked through this
reclassiﬁcation, but dysentery/diarrhea-related diseases cannot–we have information on these diseases
only for 1940 (which is what we need to construct the predicted mortality instrument), but they are
not included in our zeroth-stage regressions in Table 4 or in our calculation of the global mortality
instrument.
For our data on cause of death in 1940, we start with the Summary of International Vital Statistics,
1937-1944, published by the Federal Security Agency (1947) of the US government immediately after
World War II. This source provides comparable comprehensive data on cause of death around 1940, as
well as longer time series on the more important diseases (i.e., death rates by country), primarily from
34League of Nations sources; however, it did not use all the available data (Federal Security Agency, 1947,
p. 2). For this reason, we ﬁll gaps for 1940 using the original sources, which are national health statistics
collected, cleaned and republished between the wars by the League of Nations Health Organization (see
Federal Security Agency, 1947, pp. 1-3); we also use information from the League and its direct postwar
successors for earlier and later data as discussed in Appendix C. A key issue is the area covered by the
registration of deaths in various countries. Apart from the very richest countries in 1940, there was
seldom universal registrationo fd e a t h ,w i t had e a t hc e r t i ﬁcate signed by a doctor. Consequently, some
of the data are for major cities, while others are for all towns or for the entire population. Unfortunately,
our sources do not always document clearly the precise coverage of the underlying data (for lower income
countries, the data almost certainly overweigh towns relative to rural areas and diseases related to urban
overcrowding are likely to be overrepresented). Nevertheless, our results are robust to using only the
more reliable data.
The League of Nations Health Organization established comparable international health statistics
for a large number of countries, but never to our knowledge published a comprehensive retrospective
of the data. Their ﬁrst relevant publication was Issue No. 7 of the Annual Epidemiological Report,
which appeared in October 1923. But only from 1929 (covering the year 1927) did this publication
include death rates from speciﬁc causes (League of Nations Health Organization, 1929). Early issues
of this publication are also refered to as Statistics of Notiﬁable Diseases. The ﬁrst six issues focused
on Eastern Europe, particularly typhus and malaria epidemics in Russia. For a comprehensive list of
publications by the League of Nations on health, see Aufricht (1951), particularly pp. 176-177. For an
explanation of the structure and purpose of the League of Nations Health Organization, see League of
Nations (1931). For more on the early development of internationally comparable health statistics, see
Stocks (1950).
We use the death rates by disease for 1930 from League of Nations Health Organization (1933).
For 1940 we use World Health Organization (1951), which provided data for 1939-46, based on the
League of Nations’ work. In addition, for malaria in 1930, we use data from the Leauge of Nations’
Malaria Commission (League of Nations Health Organization, 1932). We also check our data against
information on location of malaria in the 1940s from American Geographical Society (1951a). Data on
deaths by disease for 1950 and 1960 are from the UN Demographic Yearbooks for 1954, 1962 and 1966.
Data for 1970 are from the UN Demographic Yearbook for 1974 and data for 1980 are from the UN
Demographic Yearbook for 1985.
We further conﬁrmed that our data do not miss major epidemics by reviewing every available inter-
war issue of the League of Nations’ Weekly Epidemiological Record. For example, for the distribution of
cholera in 1938, see Weekly Epidemiological Record, March 3rd, 1938. For the distribution of small pox
in 1930, see Weekly Epidemiological Record, August 21st, 1930; for 1938, see Weekly Epidemiological
Record, March 3rd, 1938; for the early 1940s see Weekly Epidemiological Record, January 3rd, 1946.
For the pre-war distribution of diphtheria, with a focus on Europe, see Weekly Epidemiological Record,
December 21st, 1939. For the distribution of plague in 1938, see Weekly Epidemiological Record, March
3rd, 1938. For more detail on the pre-1940 distribution of typhus, see Weekly Epidemiological Record,
September 14th, 1939. For the endemic yellow fever zone in 1951, see the Supplement to the Weekly
Epidemiological Record, 25 September 1952. We also conﬁrm that our numbers are consistent with con-
temporary qualitative assessments, in particular in the League of Nations and WHO’s annual reports.
Further details on these checks and data sources are provided in Appendix C.
Predicted mortality in 1940 is calculated by adding deaths per 100,000 from the 15 component
diseases (for ease of exposition, we then convert to per 100 of population). Preston (1980) points out
that data on precise cause of death should be handled with care; for example, it is notoriously diﬃcult
to determine how many deaths are due directly and indirectly to malaria. While this is an important
warning in general, our analysis is about changes in total predicted mortality from infectious disease
and because most of the global interventions were clustered in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this issue
is less of a concern here.
Years of schooling are from the Barro-Lee dataset, downloadable from the NBER website. Our
investment data are based on Maddison (1992), but we ﬁll gaps with data for the early 1950s from
Kuznets (1960). More details are provided in Appendix C.
3510 Appendix B: List and Details On Diseases
The main text reviewed the etiology of and global “interventions” against the three diseases in our data
responsible for the most deaths: malaria, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Here we provide details on
the remaining 12 infectious diseases, in rough descending order of their contribution to global deaths
around 1940 (see Kiple, 1993, Hoﬀ and Smith, 2000, Heymann 2004, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention website). The relevant global interventions are (a) new drugs for treatment
that became available globally (particularly antibiotics where relevant), (b) new preventive measures
that became available globally (particularly vaccines and chemicals that were eﬀective against insects)
and, (c) speciﬁc WHO campaigns against diseases. It is useful to note that the timing of interventions
would not be changed if we word to put greater emphasis on sulphur drugs. Sulfonamide drugs were
invented in the 1930s, but were often toxic and not available in the most eﬀective doses (see Conybeare,
1948, pp. 65-66). This changed only from 1939, when the drugs became more eﬀective (though Loudon,
2002, puts the useful breakthrough a little earlier).
Inﬂuenza is caused by various strains of the inﬂuenza virus, including type A (the most danger-
ous), type B, and type C. Transmission is through coughing, sneezing, or directly through mucous
membranes. Associated deaths are often due to various secondary bacterial infections. The primary
control mechanism is vaccination, but the introduction of antibiotics from the 1940s reduced deaths
from secondary bacterial infections. There has been no global campaign to eradicate inﬂuenza, but
WHO eﬀorts to control and track the disease started in the 1950s. For an assessment of measures
taken against inﬂuenza during 1921-50, see Deutschman (1953). In our baseline instrument we take the
intervention date as the 1940s (antibiotics) and in our alternative instrument we take the 1950s (WHO
action).
Cholera is caused by the bacterium Vibrio cholerae, and is transmitted by drinking contaminated
water or eating contaminated food. Public works to properly treat or dispose of sewage have been
eﬀective against the disease since the mid-nineteenth century. Some antibiotics reduce the symptoms,
but oral rehydration or intraveneous ﬂuids are needed to replace minerals and ﬂuids lost due to diarrhoea.
Major steps to improve the eﬀectiveness of oral rehydration were taken during the 1950s; in part these
innovations were supported by the US military. For our baseline instrument we take the intervention
date as the 1950s (rehydration therapy) and in our alternative instrument we take the 1940s (antibiotics).
Typhoid is caused by the bacterium Salmonella typhi and is transmitted through feces, either
directly or by ﬂies. It can be treated eﬀectively with antibiotics (available since the 1940s). We take the
introduction of antibiotics in the 1940s as the intervention date for both our baseline and alternative
instruments.
Smallpox was caused by the viruses Variola major (the more deadly) and Variola minor. The disease
was highly contagious, with the virus spreading through contact or through the air. Since 1798 the
primary treatment has been vaccination. The WHO passed a resolution declaring the need to eradicate
the disease in 1958 and the invention of the jet injector with foot pedal in 1962 made it possible to
easily vaccinate people in places without electricity. In 1979, smallpox was declared entirely eradicated.
In our baseline instrument we take the 1950s as our intervention date and in our alternative instrument
we take the 1960s.
Shigella dysentery is caused by the bacterium Shigella dysenteriae type 1 or by the protozoan
Endamoeba histolytica and is transmitted in the same fashion as typhoid. While we do not have fully
comparable international data on dysentery, there are data on deaths from diarrhea among infants under
the age of 2; we convert these into per 100 population equivalent and add to our predicted mortality
estimates. The disease is controlled with public health measures, antibiotics, and rehydration therapy.
We take the 1940s as our intervention date for our baseline instrument (based on antibiotics) and the
1950s for our alternative instrument (based on rehydration therapy).
Whooping cough is caused by the bacteria Bordetella pertussis. It can be treated with antibiotics
and prevented by vaccination (which is one component of the DTP vaccine). The vaccine became
available in the 1920s. We take the 1940s as our intervention date both for our baseline and alternative
instruments (based on the eﬀectiveness of antibiotics).
Measles (rubeola) is caused by a virus of the Rubivirus genus; it spreads through airborne droplets
36from an infected person.48 Prevention is through vaccination, which became available in 1963; this
is also eﬀective if administered within three days of exposure to the disease. Currently the largest
vaccine-preventable killer of children, it may be targeted for global eradication. We take the 1960s as
our intervention date for both our baseline and alternative instruments.
Diphtheria is caused by the bacterium Corynebacterium diphtheriae when it has been infected by
certain bacteriophages (parasites that only infect bacteria). Transmission is through the air or by
touch. It can be treated with antitoxins and antibiotics. An antitoxin has been available since the
1890s and immunization spread after its introduction in the early 1920s (usually provided today in
the DTP, diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis, vaccine for infants). Treatment became more eﬀective with the
introduction of antibiotics in the 1940s. We take the 1940s as our intervention date for our baseline
and alternative instruments (based on antibiotics).
Scarlet fever is caused by the Streptococcus bacteria; it often develops in strep throat patients and
is similarly spread by droplets from an infected person (e.g., coughing or sneezing). It generally can
be treated with antibiotics, including penicillin. We take the 1940s as our intervention date for our
baseline and alternative instruments (based on antibiotics).
Yellow fever is caused by the yellow fever virus, and transmitted by the bite of an infected Aedes
aegepti mosquito. It is controlled by vaccination and public health measures against the mosquito
vector. The vector was deﬁnitively identiﬁed by Walter Reed, head of the U.S. Army Yellow Fever
Commission, in 1900-1901. The ﬁrst vaccine was developed by Max Theiler in the 1937 and was widely
used in the 1940s. We take the 1940s as the intervention date for our baseline instrument and the 1930s
for our alternative instrument.
Plague is caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis and is transmitted from infected animals to
humans through the bite of an infected ﬂea. The disease is controlled through antibiotics, especially
streptomycin, and the elimination of rodent population near human habitations. Some protection from
vaccination has been available since the end of the nineteenth century. The WHO attempts to help
deal with outbreaks. We take the introduction of the antibiotics in the 1940s as the intervention date
for both our baseline and alternative instruments.
Typhus is caused by any microbe of the genus Rickettsia, and is transmitted by insects (lice, ﬂeas,
mites, and ticks). Antibiotics are usually an eﬀective treatment. Public health measures include good
hygiene and sanitation. Once again, based on antibiotics, the 1940s are the intervention date for both
our baseline and alternative instruments.
48This is a diﬀerent disease, caused by a diﬀerent virus, than German measles (rubella). Vaccines for both
are included in the MMR vaccine (measles-mumps-rubella).
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Life expectancy in 1900 30.90 37.04 49.36 36.92 28.77
(8.83) (10.45) (3.67) (8.13) (5.42)
Life expectancy in 1940 47.77 49.30 65.14 50.94 40.63
(11.53) (12.68) (1.86) (9.38) (8.40)
Life expectancy in 1980 61.14 66.19 74.31 69.66 61.93
(11.02) (7.49) (1.13) (4.58) (7.19)
Predicted mortality in 1940 n.a. 0.48 0.17 0.48 0.53
(0.28) (0.05) (0.22) (0.32)
Log population in 1940 8.94 9.07 9.35 8.82 9.15
(1.55) (1.55) (1.34) (1.41) (1.79)
Log population in 1980 8.89 9.71 9.76 9.44 10.00
(1.62) (1.31) (1.29) (1.26) (1.75)
Log GDP in 1940 9.78 9.89 11.08 9.75 9.19
(1.68) (1.61) (1.40) (1.49) (1.71)
Log GDP in 1980 10.00 11.34 12.47 11.42 10.89
(1.98) (1.40) (1.33) (1.36) (1.52)
Log GDP per capita in 1940 7.65 7.73 8.64 7.84 6.95
(0.69) (0.71) (0.15) (0.34) (0.33)
Log GDP per capita in 1980 7.99 8.54 9.62 8.89 7.79
(1.08) (0.90) (0.13) (0.45) (0.74)
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean values of variables; standard deviation in parentheses. Base sample is 59 countries. Initially rich countries had log GDP per 
capita over 8.4 in 1940; middle income had log GDP per capita between 7.37 and 8.4 in 1940; and low income countries had log 
GDP per capita below 7.37 in 1940. Predicted mortality is per 100 per annum. "n.a." denotes not available. See text and Appendix 
A for details and definitions.All Countries
Low & Middle 
Income 
Countries Only
No leads No leads No leads No leads 10 year lead 20 year lead 10 year lead 20 year lead 10 year lead 20 year lead





















Log Life Expectancy 1.46 1.69 1.21 1.24 1.72 1.61 1.34 0.97 1.33 1.26
(0.29) (0.43) (0.20) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34) (0.46) (0.46) (0.22) (0.21)
Number of observations 600 294 282 249 480 360 235 176 282 282
Number of countries 120 59 59 48 120 120 59 59 59 59
Just 1960 and 
2000
Just 1960 and 
2000
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Log Life Expectancy 1.60 1.74 1.62 1.86 1.92 1.70 1.42 0.98 1.71 1.62
(0.42) (0.57) (0.22) (0.36) (0.35) (0.41) (0.57) (0.58) (0.24) (0.21)
Number of observations 240 118 94 72 240 240 118 118 94 94





















Log Life Expectancy 1.90 2.02 1.87 1.85 1.65 0.75 1.39 0.30 1.46 1.14
(0.40) (0.46) (0.28) (0.36) (0.42) (0.47) (0.49) (0.57) (0.20) (0.23)
Number of observations 460 188 233 198 345 230 141 94 234 187
Number of countries 115 47 47 36 115 115 47 47 47 47
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1970
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1970
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1970
Life Expectancy 2.09 2.00 1.88 1.97 1.72 0.75 1.37 0.30 1.55 1.30
(0.53) (0.42) (0.41) (0.47) (0.50) (0.47) (0.59) (0.57) (0.25) (0.31)
Number of observations 230 94 92 70 230 230 94 94 92 92
Number of countries 115 47 46 35 115 115 47 47 46 46
Table 2
Base Sample
Panel D: Dependent variable is log number of births
Life Expectancy, Population, and Births: OLS Estimates
Panel C: Dependent variable is log number of births
Panel A: Dependent variable is log population
Panel B: Dependent variable is log population
Dependent variable indicated for each panel separately
All Countries
OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. 
Panels A and C are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. Panels B and D are long-difference specifications with observations for 
only the beginning and end dates. Dependent variable is log population in Panels A and B and log total births in Panels C and D. Independent 
variable in all regressions is log life expectancy at birth. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable and independent variable are for the same time 
period; in columns 5-10, the dependent variable is for t+10 or t+20 as indicated, while the independent variable is for time t. "All countries" are 
those for which we have data on the dependent and independent variables. Base sample is countries for which we have disease data. 
Assignment of countries to low and middle income categories is based on 1940 income per capita; see text and Appendix A for details and 
definitions.
Base SampleAll Countries
Low & Middle 
Income 
Countries Only
No leads No leads No leads No leads 10 year lead 20 year lead 10 year lead 20 year lead 10 year lead 20 year lead





















Log Life Expectancy 1.35 1.70 0.73 0.65 1.09 0.29 1.37 0.97 0.73 0.90
(0.49) (0.45) (0.35) (0.42) (0.44) (0.62) (0.37) (0.52) (0.24) (0.30)
Number of observations 600 294 283 228 480 360 235 176 283 283
Number of countries 120 59 59 48 120 120 59 59 59 59
Just 1960 and 
2000
Just 1960 and 
2000
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Log Life Expectancy 1.17 1.55 0.78 0.65 1.07 0.39 1.61 1.11 0.75 0.92
(0.80) (0.49) (0.58) (0.73) (0.59) (0.76) (0.48) (1.02) (0.39) (0.47)
Number of observations 240 118 94 72 240 240 118 116 94 94





















Log Life Expectancy -0.10 0.003 -0.44 -0.44 -0.63 -1.31 0.03 -0.001 -0.57 -0.33
(0.48) (0.46) (0.30) (0.23) (0.51) (0.69) (0.50) (0.75) (0.28) (0.39)
Number of observations 600 294 283 228 480 360 235 176 283 283
Number of countries 120 59 59 48 120 120 59 59 59 59
Just 1960 and 
2000
Just 1960 and 
2000
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1960 and 
1990
Just 1960 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Log Life Expectancy -0.42 -0.19 -0.81 -0.13 -0.84 -1.31 0.18 -0.48 -0.96 -0.70
(0.82) (0.76) (0.42) (0.69) (0.70) (0.85) (0.82) (1.18) (0.43) (0.50)
Number of observations 240 118 94 54 240 240 118 116 94 94
Number of countries 120 59 47 27 120 120 59 58 47 47
Table 3
Panel C: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Panel A: Dependent variable is log GDP
Panel B: Dependent variable is log GDP
Dependent variable indicated for each panel separately
All Countries
Life Expectancy, GDP and GDP per capita: OLS Estimates
OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. 
Panels A and C are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. Panels B and D are long-difference specifications with observations for 
only the beginning and end dates. Dependent variable is log total GDP in Panels A and B and log GDP per capita in Panels C and D. 
Independent variable in all regressions is log life expectancy at birth. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable and independent variable are for the
same time period; in columns 5-10, the dependent variable is for t+10 or t+20 as indicated, while the independent variable is for time t. "All 
countries" are those for which we have data on the dependent and independent variables. Base sample is countries for which we have disease 
data. Assignment of countries to low and middle income categories is based on 1940 income per capita; see text and Appendix A for details and 
definitions.
Panel D: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intervention -46.04 -43.33 -46.04 -33.93 -36.31 -48.57 -48.62





R-squared 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48
Number of observations 1479 1479 1479 1327 1364 1361 1328




diphtheria Just TB Just pneumonia Just malaria
Just 
influenza
Intervention -0.25 -8.84 -2.47 -108.51 -137.92 -19.97 -14.95
(0.10) (3.01) (0.92) (22.91) (26.96) (9.67) (11.37)
R-squared 0.56 0.71 0.63 0.72 0.82 0.58 0.61
Number of observations 140 148 147 152 115 118 151
Number of countries 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
OLS regressions with a full set of disease, year, and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering by country-disease pair, in parentheses. Unbalanced panels with data for 1930, 1940, 1950 and 1960. 
Data are stacked; dependent variable is deaths per 100,000 from disease i in country j at year t. Base sample is 
15 infectious diseases plus cancer and malignant tumors. Independent variables: dummy for intervention (e.g., 
for malaria equals 1 for 1950 and 1960, zero otherwise), dummy for lead intervention (e.g., for malaria equals 1 
for 1940, 1950 and 1960), dummy for lagged intervention (e.g., for malaria equals 1 for 1960). 
Panel, 1930-1960
Table 4
The Effect of Interventions on Disease Mortality (zeroth stage)
Dependent Variable is mortality per 100,000 from disease i in country j at 
period tAlternative 
timing

















































Predicted Mortality  -0.33 -0.36 -0.34 -0.23 -0.32 -0.27 -0.24 -0.25 -0.41 -0.26 -0.33 -0.35
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08)
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Number of observations 283 316 312 228 230 271 243 283 263 208 283 283
Number of countries 59 59 65 48 46 56 49 59 59 48 59 59
Panel B
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1930 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1960
Just 1940 and 
1960
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Predicted Mortality  -0.44 -0.53 -0.46 -0.31 -0.45 -0.35 -0.25 -0.30 -0.40 -0.29 -0.45 -0.49
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09) (0.11)
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95
Number of observations 94 66 106 72 92 94 94 94 94 72 94 94
Number of countries 47 33 53 36 46 47 47 47 47 36 47 47
Balanced panel is countries with no missing data between 1940 and 1980. In columns 6-8 we include time dummies interacted with: in column 6, institutions, measured as 
constraint on the executive in 1950, 1960, and 1970, from Polity IV; in column 7, log GDP per capita in 1930; and in column 8, a full set of continent dummies (Africa, Asia, 
Americas, Europe; Oceania is the omitted category).
Table 5
OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Panel A is unbalanced panel with 
one observation per decade. Panel B is long-difference specifications with observations for only the beginning and end dates. Dependent variable in both panels is log life 
expectancy at birth. Independent variable in columns 1-8 is baseline predicted mortality; in columns 9-10, global mortality; in column 11, predicted mortality has alternative 
timing, and in column 12 predicted mortality is constructed from tuberculosis, pneumonia, and malaria deaths only. See text and Appendix A for the construction of the 
predicted mortality instrument, definitions and data sources. Eastern Europe is countries that became part of the Soviet bloc after 1945. Assignment of countries to low and 
middle income categories is based on 1940 income per capita. 
Base Sample
Dependent Variable is log life expectancy
Using global mortality rate
First Stage Estimates: Predicted Mortality and Life Expectancy
Base Sample




lagged LE w/ 
second lag of LE
GMM (Arellano
Bond)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Predicted Mortality -0.33 -0.18 -0.27 -0.19 -0.20 -0.33 -0.20 -0.31 -0.14 -0.15
(0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Lagged Log Life Expectancy 0.44 0.32 0.71 0.45 0.53
(0.09) (0.39) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Lagged Predicted Mortality -0.17 -0.17
(0.03) (0.03)
Lead Predicted Mortality 0.19 0.14
(1.04) (1.04)
Lagged Log GDP per capita -0.06 -0.07
(0.04) (0.02)
p-value of test for 2nd order autocorrelation 0.83
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.014
R-squared 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.96
Number of observations 283 267 231 248 283 283 283 273 257 266
Number of countries 59 59 57 59 59 59 59 59 59 56
Panel, 1940-1980
OLS (columns 1-2 and 5-10) and 2SLS (columns 3-4) regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering by country, in parentheses. All columns are unbalanced panels with one observation per decade, using base sample countries. Dependent variable in 
is log life expectancy at birth. Independent variables vary by column; lagged values are 10 years earlier and lead predicted mortality is 10 years ahead. 
Assignment of countries to low and middle income categories is based on 1940 income per capita. In column 3, the second lag of log life expectancy is used as 
an instrument for lagged log life expectancy. In column 4, GMM of Arellano-Bond uses all available lags of log life expectancy as instruments.  Balanced panel 
is countries with no missing data between 1940 and 1980.
Base Sample
Table 6
First Stage Estimates: Mean Reversion and Robustness
Dependent Variable is log life expectancy
OLS OLS OLSBase Sample
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: falsification exercise
    Dependent variable is: --
Change in Predicted Mortality 0.14 0.21 -0.06 -0.08 -0.18 -0.27 -0.12 -0.18
  from 1940 to 1980 (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.29) (0.22) (0.36) (0.17) (0.22)
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.003 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.0095 0.01
Number of countries 47 36 29 19 29 19 29 19
Panel B: reduced forms
    Dependent variable is: --
Change in Predicted Mortality -0.43 -0.30 -0.76 -0.65 -0.27 -0.03 0.48 0.59
  from 1940 to 1980 (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.21) (0.25) (0.32) (0.17) (0.23)
R-squared 0.46 0.26 0.31 0.19 0.003 0.0003 0.12 0.12
Number of countries 57 46 49 38 49 38 49 38
change in log GDP 
per capita from 1900 
to 1940
Falsification Exercise and Reduced Forms
Table 7
change in log 
population from 1900 
to 1940
change in log GDP 
from 1900 to 1940
change in life 
expectancy from 1900 
to 1940
change in life 
expectancy from 1940 
to 1980
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Both panels regress change in variable indicated from start to end date on 
change in predicted mortality from 1940 to 1980. Predicted mortality is deaths per 100 population. Panel A uses subset of base sample 
for which data on all outcome variables are available and for which there is no discontinuity in boundaries of country during the relevant 
period.
change in log 
population from 1940 
to 1980
change in log GDP 
from 1940 to 1980
change in log GDP 








































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A
Log Life Expectancy 1.31 1.35 1.48 1.58 1.22 1.33 1.65 1.50 1.58 1.49 1.17
(0.37) (0.36) (0.39) (0.76) (0.50) (0.35) (0.40) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37) (0.39)
p-value for Year Dummies x  [0.02] [0.003]
   Institutions or initial log population
Number of observations 283 316 312 228 272 244 263 284 284 226 167
Number of countries 59 59 63 46 56 49 59 59 59 59 59
No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads 10 year lead 20 year lead 30 year lead 40 year lead
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1930 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Panel B
Log Life Expectancy 1.67 1.62 1.79 2.40 1.63 1.68 1.70 1.79 1.75 1.63 1.48
(0.50) (0.56) (0.50) (1.01) (0.73) (0.44) (0.48) (0.47) (0.42) (0.47) (0.45)
Post year dummy x -0.01 -0.06
   Institutions or initial log population (0.05) (0.03)
Number of observations 94 66 106 72 94 94 94 94 94 80 80
Number of countries 47 33 53 36 47 47 47 47 47 40 40
2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Panel A is unbalanced 
panel with one observation per decade. Panel B is long-difference specification with observations for only the beginning and end dates. Dependent variable in both 
panels is log total population. Independent variable in both panels is log life expectancy at birth. In columns 1-6 and 8-11, log life expectancy is instrumented by 
predicted mortality (baseline instrument), and in column 7 it is instrumented by global mortality. First stages are in Table 5. In columns 1-7, the dependent and 
independent variables are for the same time period; in columns 8-11, the dependent variable is t+10, t+20 etc., as indicated, while the independent variable is at time 
t. Columns 5 and 6 include year dummies interacted with: institutions, in column 5, as average of constraint on executive in 1950, 1960, and 1970 from Polity IV, 
where scores range from 1 to 7 and non-independent countries are assigned score of 1; and initial log population, in column 6, is for 1930. See text and Appendix A 




The Effect of Life Expectancy on Log Population: 2SLS Estimates












































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A
Log Life Expectancy 2.39 2.16 2.59 3.10 2.32 2.27 2.46 1.66 1.81 1.03 0.04
(0.69) (0.60) (0.72) (1.49) (1.01) (0.60) (0.60) (0.38) (0.50) (0.52) (0.53)
p-value for Year Dummies x  [0.33] [0.03]
   Institutions or initial log births
Number of observations 233 264 261 178 233 221 231 234 187 140 93
Number of countries 47 47 53 36 47 45 47 47 47 47 47
No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads 10 year lead 20 year lead 30 year lead 40 year lead
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1930 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1970
Just 1940 and 
1960
Just 1940 and 
1950
Panel B
Log Life Expectancy 2.53 2.03 2.66 2.92 2.40 2.53 2.50 1.62 1.52 0.87 0.05
(0.73) (0.87) (0.73) (1.40) (1.12) (0.70) (0.73) (0.46) (0.54) (0.58) (0.53)
Post year dummy x -0.02 -0.06
   Institutions or initial log births (0.09) (0.05)
Number of observations 90 88 98 68 90 88 90 90 90 90 90
Number of countries 45 44 49 34 45 44 45 45 45 45 45
2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Panel A is 
unbalanced panel with one observation per decade. Panel B is long-difference specification with observations for only the beginning and end dates. Dependent
variable in both panels is log total births. Independent variable in both panels is log life expectancy at birth. In columns 1-6 and 8-11, log life expectancy is 
instrumented by predicted mortality (baseline instrument), and in column 7 it is instrumented by global mortality. First stages are in Table 5. In columns 1-7, the 
dependent and independent variables are for the same time period; in columns 8-11, the dependent variable is t+10, t+20 etc., as indicated, while the 
independent variable is at time t. Columns 5 and 6 include year dummies interacted with: institutions, in column 5, as average of constraint on executive in 
1950, 1960, and 1970 from Polity IV, where scores range from 1 to 7 and non-independent countries are assigned score of 1; and initial log births, in column 6, 
is for 1930. See text and Appendix A for construction of the mortality instruments, definitions, and data sources.
Base Sample
Table 9
The Effect of Life Expectancy on Log Births: 2SLS Estimates
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GDP





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A
Log Life Expectancy -0.03 -0.13 0.11 -0.28 -0.35 -0.49 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.14
(0.67) (0.62) (0.66) (1.19) (0.82) (0.58) (0.59) (0.48) (0.44) (0.60) (0.85)
p-value for Year Dummies x  [0.005] [0.01]
   Institutions or initial GDP
Number of observations 283 316 312 228 271 243 263 283 283 224 165
Number of countries 59 59 65 48 56 49 59 59 59 59 59
No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads 10 year lead 20 year lead 30 year lead 40 year lead
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1930 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1970
Just 1940 and 
1960
Panel B
Log Life Expectancy 0.32 0.06 0.43 -0.39 -0.11 -0.07 0.51 0.55 0.64 0.64 0.33
(0.84) (0.95) (0.82) (1.44) (0.98) (0.73) (0.71) (0.63) (0.66) (0.76) (0.94)
Post year dummy x -0.06 -0.11
   Institutions or initial GDP (0.06) (0.06)
Number of observations 94 94 106 72 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of countries 47 47 53 36 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Panel A is unbalanced 
panel with one observation per decade. Panel B is long-difference specification with observations for only the beginning and end dates. Dependent variable in both 
panels is log GDP. Independent variable in both panels is log life expectancy at birth. In columns 1-6 and 8-11, log life expectancy is instrumented by predicted 
mortality (baseline instrument), and in column 7 it is instrumented by global mortality. First stages are in Table 5. In columns 1-7, the dependent and independent 
variables are for the same time period; in columns 8-11, the dependent variable is t+10, t+20 etc., as indicated, while the independent variable is at time t. Columns 5 
and 6 include year dummies interacted with: institutions, in column 5, as average of constraint on executive in 1950, 1960, and 1970 from Polity IV, where scores range 
from 1 to 7 and non-independent countries are assigned score of 1; and initial GDP, in column 6, is for 1930. See text and Appendix A for construction of the mortality 
instruments, definitions, and data sources.
Base Sample
Table 10
The Effect of Life Expectancy on Log GDP: 2SLS Estimates



















Initial (1930) log 
GDP p.c.





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A
Log Life Expectancy -1.30 -1.39 -1.32 -1.76 -1.45 -0.46 -1.17 -0.98 -1.04 -0.87 -1.04
(0.53) (0.46) (0.53) (1.13) (0.74) (0.85) (0.45) (0.39) (0.45) (0.55) (0.90)
p-value for Year Dummies x  [0.02] [0.03]
   Institutions or initial GDP pc
Number of observations 283 316 312 228 271 243 263 283 283 224 165
Number of countries 59 59 65 48 56 49 59 59 59 59 59
No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads 10 year lead 20 year lead 30 year lead 40 year lead
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1930 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1970
Just 1940 and 
1960
Panel B
Log Life Expectancy -1.32 -1.44 -1.33 -2.35 -1.64 -1.59 -1.17 -1.24 -1.12 -0.92 -0.89
(0.56) (0.61) (0.54) (1.13) (0.77) (1.22) (0.51) (0.66) (0.78) (0.81) (1.01)
Post year dummy x -0.05 0.07
   Institutions or initial GDP pc (0.06) (0.28)
Number of observations 94 94 106 72 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of countries 47 47 53 36 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Panel A is unbalanced 
panel with one observation per decade. Panel B is long-difference specification with observations for only the beginning and end dates. Dependent variable in both 
panels is log GDP per capita. Independent variable in both panels is log life expectancy at birth. In columns 1-6 and 8-11, log life expectancy is instrumented by 
predicted mortality (baseline instrument), and in column 7 it is instrumented global mortality. First stages are in Table 5. In columns 1-7, the dependent and 
independent variables are for the same time period; in columns 8-11, the dependent variable is t+10, t+20 etc., as indicated, while the independent variable is at time t. 
Columns 5 and 6 include year dummies interacted with: institutions, in column 5, as average of constraint on executive in 1950, 1960, and 1970 from Polity IV, where 
scores range from 1 to 7 and non-independent countries are assigned score of 1; and initial GDP per capita, in column 6, is for 1930. See text and Appendix A for 




The Effect of Life Expectancy on Log GDP per capita: 2SLS Estimates
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
 
Log Life Expectancy -0.50 -0.42 -0.73 -0.14 0.07 1.10 5.01 1.40 -1.40
(1.45) (4.15) (5.92) (1.63) (4.51) (6.52) (1.65) (3.67) (5.17)
Number of observations 212 212 168 159 159 126 106 106 84
Number of countries 53 53 40 53 53 42 53 53 42
Table 12
Base Sample Base Sample
OLS and 2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in 
parentheses.Unbalanced panel with one observation per decade. Dependent variable is years of schooling. Independent variable  is log life 
expectancy at birth. In columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9, log life expectancy is instrumented by predicted mortality (baseline instrument). First 
stages are in Table 5. In columns 1-3, the dependent and independent variables are for the same time period; in columns 4-9, the 
dependent variable is t+10, t+20, and t+30 as indicated, while the independent variable is at time t. See text and Appendix A for construction 
of the predicted mortality instrument, definitions and data sources.
Base Sample
Dependent variable is years of schooling






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Dependent variable -
Log Life Expectancy 1.35 1.77 3.87 2.63 1.26 1.55 -0.12 0.03 -0.80 -0.09 -0.22 0.33
(0.37) (0.35) (2.42) (0.93) (0.39) (0.38) (0.63) (0.49) (2.11) (1.09) (0.70) (0.59)
Predicted Mortality  -0.34 -0.39 -0.29 -0.34 -0.33 -0.44 -0.34 -0.39 -0.29 -0.34 -0.33 -0.44
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
R-squared 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.95
Number of observations 445 445 343 343 238 238 445 445 343 343 238 238
Number of countries 102 102 102 102 54 54 102 102 102 102 54 54
Table 13
Panel B: Dependent variable is log life expectancy (first stage regression)
Base Sample plus Africa
Base Sample without countries 
most affected by WWII
The Effect of Life Expectancy on Population and Log GDP, Alternative Samples: 2SLS Estimates, with First Stages
Base Sample plus Africa
Base Sample without countries 
most affected by WWII Base Sample plus Africa
Log GDP
Base Sample plus Africa
All regressions have full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Unbalanced panel with one observation per 
decade. Panel A is 2SLS results; dependent variable in columns 1-6 is log population and in columns 7-12 is log GDP; independent variable is log life expectancy at birth. Panel B is 
corresponding first stage, with predicted mortality as the instrument. In odd columns, log life expectancy is instrumented by predicted mortality (baseline instrument), and in even 
columns it is instrumented by global mortality. For the second stage, columns 1-2, 5-6, 7-8, and 11-12, the dependent and independent variables are for the same time period; in 
columns 3-4 and 9-10, the dependent variable is t+30, while the independent variable is at time t. For columns 1-4 and 7-10, data on post-1950 Africa are added to our base sample. 
For columns 5-6 and 11-12, data on countries most affected demographically by World War II are excluded (Austria, China, Finland, Germany, and Italy). See text and Appendix A for 







Expectancy Population Total GDP
GDP per 
capita
Argentina Middle 1940 0.205 56.5 14,169 58,963 4,161
Argentina 1980 0.000 69.6 28,370 232,802 8,206
Australia Rich 1940 0.232 66.8 7,042 43,422 6,166
Australia 1980 0.000 74.4 14,616 210,642 14,412
Austria Middle 1940 0.299 60.2 6,705 26,547 3,959
Austria 1980 0.000 72.7 7,549 103,874 13,759
Bangladesh Poor 1940 0.668 29.9 41,966 25,044 597
Bangladesh 1980 0.000 48.5 88,077 48,239 548
Belgium Rich 1940 0.156 61.8 8,346 38,072 4,562
Belgium 1980 0.000 73.2 9,847 142,458 14,467
Brazil Poor 1940 0.525 36.7 41,114 51,381 1,250
Brazil 1980 0.000 62.7 122,958 639,093 5,198
Canada Rich 1940 0.121 64.2 11,688 62,744 5,368
Canada 1980 0.000 74.7 24,593 397,814 16,176
Chile Middle 1940 0.803 42.0 5,093 16,596 3,259
Chile 1980 0.000 69.3 11,094 63,654 5,738
China Poor 1940 0.291 43.9 518,770 291,603 562
China 1980 0.000 65.3 981,235 1,046,781 1,067
Colombia Middle 1940 0.535 37.9 9,174 17,386 1,895
Colombia 1980 0.000 65.9 26,583 113,375 4,265
Costa Rica Middle 1940 0.667 49.3 620 1,093 1,763
Costa Rica 1980 0.000 72.7 2,299 11,290 4,911
Denmark Rich 1940 0.121 65.5 3,832 19,606 5,116
Denmark 1980 0.000 74.3 5,123 78,010 15,227
Ecuador Poor 1940 0.930 39.3 2,466 3,344 1,546
Ecuador 1980 0.000 63.3 7,920 32,706 4,129
El Salvador Poor 1940 0.970 34.5 1,630 1,811 1,111
El Salvador 1980 0.000 57.1 4,566 10,748 2,354
Finland Middle 1940 0.223 57.3 3,698 11,909 3,220
Finland 1980 0.000 73.2 4,780 61,890 12,949
France Middle 1940 0.279 60.0 41,000 165,729 4,042
France 1980 0.000 74.3 53,870 813,763 15,106
Germany Rich 1940 0.183 63.5 69,835 377,284 5,403
Germany 1980 0.000 72.6 78,298 1,105,099 14,114
Greece Middle 1940 0.409 54.4 7,280 16,183 2,223
Greece 1980 0.000 74.4 9,643 86,505 8,971
Guatemala Middle 1940 0.806 30.4 2,200 6,033 2,742
Guatemala 1980 0.000 57.4 7,235 26,632 3,681
Honduras Poor 1940 0.609 32.5 1,150 1,334 1,160
Honduras 1980 0.000 60.0 3,635 7,014 1,930
India Poor 1940 1.126 30.0 321,565 265,455 686
India 1980 0.000 54.4 679,000 637,202 938
Indonesia Poor 1940 0.877 34.3 70,175 86,682 1,235
Indonesia 1980 0.000 54.8 147,490 275,805 1,870
Ireland Middle 1940 0.306 59.8 2,958 9,028 3,052
Ireland 1980 0.000 72.7 3,401 29,047 8,541
Italy Middle 1940 0.816 58.7 44,341 155,424 3,505
Appendix Table A1






Expectancy Population Total GDP
GDP per 
capita
Italy 1980 0.000 73.9 56,451 742,299 13,149
Korea, Rep. Poor 1940 0.185 48.7 15,627 22,536 1,442
Korea, Rep. 1980 0.000 66.8 38,124 156,846 4,114
Malaysia Poor 1940 0.317 42.6 5,434 6,945 1,278
Malaysia 1980 0.000 66.9 13,764 50,333 3,657
Mexico Middle 1940 0.621 43.6 20,393 37,767 1,852
Mexico 1980 0.000 66.8 68,686 431,983 6,289
Myanmar Poor 1940 0.621 36.6 16,594 12,274 740
Myanmar 1980 0.000 52.1 33,283 27,381 823
Netherlands Rich 1940 0.180 67.4 8,879 42,898 4,831
Netherlands 1980 0.000 75.7 14,144 207,979 14,705
New Zealand Rich 1940 0.214 67.7 1,636 10,308 6,300
New Zealand 1980 0.000 73.2 3,170 39,141 12,347
Nicaragua Poor 1940 0.476 34.5 830 1,139 1,372
Nicaragua 1980 0.000 58.7 2,804 6,043 2,155
Norway Middle 1940 0.214 67.3 2,973 12,152 4,088
Norway 1980 0.000 75.7 4,086 61,811 15,129
Pakistan Poor 1940 0.813 30.0 28,169 20,137 715
Pakistan 1980 0.000 55.1 85,219 98,907 1,161
Panama Middle 1940 0.595 42.4 697 1,199 1,721
Panama 1980 0.000 70.1 1,956 9,961 5,091
Paraguay Middle 1940 0.364 46.6 1,111 1,947 1,752
Paraguay 1980 0.000 66.8 3,193 10,549 3,304
Peru Middle 1940 0.832 40.6 6,298 11,483 1,823
Peru 1980 0.000 60.4 17,295 72,723 4,205
Philippines Poor 1940 0.976 47.3 16,585 26,326 1,587
Philippines 1980 0.000 61.1 50,940 121,012 2,376
Portugal Middle 1940 0.623 50.3 7,675 12,396 1,615
Portugal 1980 0.000 71.4 9,778 78,655 8,044
Spain Middle 1940 0.387 50.2 25,757 53,585 2,080
Spain 1980 0.000 75.5 37,488 344,987 9,203
Sri Lanka Poor 1940 0.617 42.3 6,134 7,673 1,251
Sri Lanka 1980 0.000 68.2 14,900 27,550 1,849
Sweden Rich 1940 0.125 66.7 6,356 30,873 4,857
Sweden 1980 0.000 75.9 8,310 124,130 14,937
Switzerland Rich 1940 0.144 64.1 4,226 27,032 6,397
Switzerland 1980 0.000 75.8 6,385 119,909 18,779
Thailand Poor 1940 0.506 42.6 15,513 12,820 826
Thailand 1980 0.000 63.6 47,026 120,116 2,554
United Kingdom Rich 1940 0.270 65.0 48,226 330,638 6,856
United Kingdom 1980 0.000 73.8 56,314 728,224 12,931
United States Rich 1940 0.132 63.8 132,637 929,737 7,010
United States 1980 0.000 73.7 227,726 4,230,558 18,577
Uruguay Middle 1940 0.344 56.5 1,965 7,193 3,661
Uruguay 1980 0.000 70.4 2,920 19,205 6,577
Venezuela, RB Middle 1940 0.496 33.9 3,784 15,307 4,045
Venezuela, RB 1980 0.000 68.3 14,768 149,735 10,139
This list contains data only on the countries in our base sample for which we have pre-1950 data.1
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Change in Predicted Mortality, 1940-80



















































Figure 4: Change in log life expectancy and change in predicted mortality, 1940-80, 









































Change in Predicted Mortality, 1940-80







































Figure 5: Change in log life expectancy, 1900-40, and change in predicted 









































Change in Predicted Mortality, 1940-80




















































Figure 6: Change in log life expectancy, 1900-40, against change in predicted mortality,









































Change in Predicted Mortality, 1940-80










































Figure 7: Change in log life expectancy, 1930-40, and change in predicted 








































Change in Predicted Mortality, 1940-80















































Figure 8: Change in log life expectancy, 1930-40, and change in predicted mortality, 1940-80, 









































Change in Predicted Mortality, 1940-80










































































Change in predicted mortality, 1940-80





















































































Change in predicted mortality, 1940-80




























































































Change in predicted mortality, 1940-80



















































VENAppendix C: Not For Publication
This appendix explains in detail the construction and sources of our life expectancy estimates for
1930 and 1940. It also contains a number of tables of additional results referred to in the main text.
1S o u r c e s
The underlying data sources are national authorities. We take the data as reported to and republished
by the United Nations. However, the UN does not appear to have produced a comprehensive set of data
for the pre-1950 period; later publications sometimes revised estimates, but they also dropped earlier
data.
At regular intervals, the UN’s Demographic Yearbooks focused on mortality and we concentrate our
a t t e n t i o no nt h e s ei s s u e s . 1 The UN’s own advice on accessing early data is helpful but not suﬃcient.
Speciﬁcally, the introduction (p. 1) of the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1978, Historical Sup-
plement (Special Issue), published in 1979 (but really dealing with data only since 1950), suggests that
readers should refer to the Demographic Yearbook 1948 for “many of the same tables showing annual
data for the period 1932 to 1947” and should use this in conjuction with the historical supplement.2
This advice is not suﬃcient, however, because the UN added and revised historical data, as far as we
can determine, in its Demographic Yearbooks through 1968.3
We also pay close attention to Preston’s (1975) data as this represents what a leading scholar decided
could be used alongside the UN’s data (at a time when the UN’s historical data had been revised and
extended). Preston’s (1975, Table A-2) estimates are “in the 1930s” but the exact date ranges from
the late 1920s to the early 1940s; we use his data for either 1930 or 1940, depending on which is closer
(and sometimes as part of an interpolation, as explained below). Preston’s most frequently used source
is the U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1967 (UN 1968) but he also provides additional data from other
country-speciﬁc work on life tables. We also note when Preston uses the same data as the U.N., as this
is an important indication of external validation. In some cases, Preston uses other data when the U.N.
estimates are available.
IVS is our abbreviation for International Vital Statistics, published by the Federal Security Agency
(1947); life expectancy data are on pp. 220-225. We use these data to ﬁll gaps where possible and more
generally to provide a further external validation of pre-war sources.
We report alternative estimates from the UN (for diﬀerent years), Preston, and IVS so readers can
s e et h er a n g eo fa v a i l a b l ed a t a .
2C o d i n g R u l e s
Our decision rule for how to combine data from alternative sources for our main data series is as follows.
1. We look for male and female life expectancy data from the same time period and calculate an
unweighted average (to match our post-1950 data that we take directly from the UN’s on-line database).4
1The U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1948 (United Nations 1949) reports life expectancy at birth on pp. 514-
523. The U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1951 (United Nations 1951) reports life exectancy at birth on pp.
526-539. The U.N Demographic Yearbook 1961 (United Nations 1961) reports life expectancy at birth on pp.
622-641. The U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1967 (United Nations 1968) reports life expectancy at birth on pp.
704-741.
2Life expectancy at birth for both males and females, generally from 1950-55, in 5 year intervals, is on pp.
542-563 of this historical supplement.
3The publication date for the UN Demographic Yearbooks does not always match the year covered by the
Yearbook, and this can be confusing. For example, UN (1949) is the Demographic Yearbook for 1948 (a one
year lag in publication), but UN (1951) is the Demographic Yearbook for 1951, UN (1961) is the Demographic
Yearbook for 1961 and UN (1968) is the Demographic Yearbook for 1967.
4We have looked at the implications of using only male life expectancy. This does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our
results.
C-12. Preston’s main source is the U.N. Demographic Yearbook for 1967 (UN 1968), but he supplements
this with clearly identiﬁed and referenced country studies that he regards as comparable (or better than
what the UN published). We also start with the UN Demographic Yearbook as our default source, as
this is more comprehensive, but prefer Preston when he has data for a year close to 1930 or 1940 (as
appropriate). We use IVS primarily as another source of validiation and to ﬁll a few gaps. If the U.N.
Demographic Yearbooks have diﬀerent data in diﬀerent editions, we use the latest Yearbook (we note
agreement or disagreement between alternative UN estimates below) through 1967 — this appears to be
the most recent year for which retrospective pre-1950 were systematically available.
3. When we have data from before and after our reference dates (1930 and 1940), we interpolate
by assuming a linear trend (which amounts to an “even-paced changed” with the same annual average
change in life expectancy over the period for which we are interpolating). If data are available for a
r a n g eo fy e a r s ,w et a k et h em i d p o i n tf o rt h ep u r p o s eo fc a l c u l a t i n gt h et r e n d .I ft h em i d p o i n ti sh a l f w a y








where X is a life expectancy, t is the reference year (1930 or 1940) and we have data from s years before
the reference year and also from k years after the reference year. For example, if the life expectancy
estimates are 50 for 1925 and 60 for 1935, we calculate life expectancy in 1930 as (50+60)/10.5
4. When the available data are only for shortly after our reference years and when we have two
datapoints to calculate a reasonable rate of change, we extrapolate backwards. In our main sample, we
only do one extrapolation for Portugal (for a period of 18 months), and in the additional in Eastern
European sample, we extrapolate for Czechoslovakia (for half a year) and Poland (for 18 months). The
extrapolation formula is:






where p i st h ed a t ec l o s e s tt ot. For example, if the life expectancy estimates are 51 for 1931 and 60 for
1940, then for 1930 we calculate the per annum change as (60-51)/9 and subtract this from the estimate
for 1931 to obtain a life expectancy of 50 in 1930.
5. For European countries aﬀected by World War II in or before 1940, we prefer data from 1938 or
1937 where available; we interpolate these data to 1940. We rely on Urlanis (2003) for an assessment
of the demographic impact from the war; where this was small, we prefer data for 1940.
6. If the data are drawn from a country that subsequently divided (e.g., India), we use these data
for all the new countries that emerged.
7. In a few cases (El Salvador, Ecuador and Honduras), when data are not available for a country,
but we have similar disease conditions, crude death rates and age structure of the population between
neighboring countries, we average the life expectancy in neighboring countries with similar disease
conditions. If an estimate is missing for a neighbor (typically for 1930), then we do not compute the
average for that year but leave it as missing. Estimates relying on information from neighbors are
dropped in additional robustness checks.
3 Life Expectancy by Country in our Base Sample
Most of the pre-1950 data we use are reported to two digits and we use them in this form in our
calculations. However, since the post-1950 UN data is reported with one digit, we round all our data to








where x is log life expectancy. The results with log-interpolation are similar.
C-2one digit in the appendix table and in the regressions. All life expectancies are at birth unless otherwise
stated.
The panel base sample refers to noncommunist base sample, which contains 47 countries from 1940
and an additional 12 countries from 1950. “Long diﬀerences” refers to the sample that has data for
1940 and 1980; this comprises 47 countries. To include a country in our base sample we need data for
1940; to be in the 1930-1940 falsiﬁcation tests we also need data for 1930; this sample is consequently
smaller.
The following 12 countries are in our panel but not in our long diﬀerences, i.e., we have data from
1950 but not before: Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Singapore,
South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam. Life expectancy data for these countries are from the UN on-line
database only.
The detail by country is as follows
1. Argentina (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1967, p. 716 and 1961, p. 626) has life expectancy in 1914 of 45.2 for males and 47.5 for
females, for an average of 46.35.6 For 1947, life expectancy for males is 56.9 and for females is 61.4, for
an average of 59.15. Using our linear interpolation equation (C1), the improvement of 12.8 years over
33 years translates to 0.39 years of extra life for each year. This yields a life expectancy of 52.6 in 1930
and of 56.5 in 1940.
We use 52.6 for 1930 and 56.5 for 1940.
2. Australia (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1949, p. 520 and 1951, p. 538) for 1932-34 has 63.48 (male) and 67.14 (female),
average of 65.31; for 1946-48, it has 66.07 (male) and 70.63 (female), average of 68.35.7 United Nations
(1968, p. 738) also reports life expectancy for 1920-22 as 59.15 (male) and 63.31 (female), for an average
of 61.23.
Taking the mid-year in each of these ranges and assuming an even pace of life expectancy increase,
from 1921 to 1933 (12 years) of 0.34 years per elapsed year implies life expectancy in 1930 (after 9
years) of 64.29. A similar calculation from 1933 to 1947 (14 years) gives 0.22 years more life expectancy
per elapsed year; this implies life expectancy in 1940 (after 7 years) of 66.83.
We use 64.3 for 1930 and 66.8 for 1940.
3. Austria (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1949, p. 516, and 1951, p. 532) for 1930-33 has 54.5 (male) and 58.5 (female), for
an average of 56.50. IVS (p. 220) and Preston use the same numbers. For 1901-1905, UN 1949 has male
life expectancy of 39.14 and female life expectancy of 41.06 (also in UN 1968, p. 722), average of 40.10;
in the 28.5 year period from 1903 to half way through 1931 there was an average improvement of 0.58
years of life expectancy per elapsed year. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 55.63 (calculating
back from the midpoint of 1930-33).
There are no data for the late 1930s or 1940 in any of our sources. The next available number from
the UN is for 1949-51, for which life expectancy is 61.91 (male) and 66.97 (female), for an average of
64.44. In the 18.5 years from half way through 1931 to 1950, there was a life expectancy improvement
of 0.43 on average per elapsed year. This implies life expectancy in 1940 (after 8.5 years) was 60.16.
We use 55.6 for 1930 and 60.2 for 1940.
4. Bangladesh (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
We use the same estimates as for India. Standard errors in all regressions are clustered by unit of
observation for original life expectancy data (i.e., pre-independence India) to account for this.
We use 26.8 for 1930 and 29.9 for 1940.
5. Belgium (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1949, p. 516, and 1951, p. 532; 1968, p. 722) for 1928-32 has 56.02 (male) and
59.79 (female), for an average of 57.91. Preston and IVS (p. 220) use the same numbers. The next
6Argentina is not in UN (1949) and Preston (1975) does not have data. The IVS (p.220) reports life
expectancy only for 1914; at birth this was 51.7 for the native population and 46.44 in the city of Buenos Aires
(both estimates are for “both sexes”).
7IVS (p. 220) and Preston (1975) use the same estimates (for 1932-34), but IVS notes that this is “except
aboriginals”.
C-3available estimates are for 1946-49, with life expectancy from UN 1968 (p. 722) given as 62.04 (male)
and 67.26 (female), average of 64.65.
Over the 17.5 years from 1930 (midpoint of 1928-32) to half way through 1947 (midpoint of 1946-
49), the average improvement in life expectancy was 0.39 years per elapsed year. This implies life
expectancy in 1940 (after 10 years) was 61.76.
We use 57.9 for 1930 and 61.8 for 1940.
6. Brazil (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
For this country, there is some discrepancy in the various UN sources. UN (1948 and 1951, p. 528)
gives 37.43 as life expectancy for “both sexes” in 1920, while UN (1968, p. 716) has life expectancy for
“both sexes” as 39.25 on average over the 1890-1920 period. UN (1961, p. 628 and 1968, p. 716) gives
life expectancy for 1940-50, as 39.3 (male) and 45.5 (female), for an average of 42.40.8 Taking these
latter data as representing 1945 (the midpoint) and taking the UN’s 1890-1920 as representing 1905
(prefering the later, presumably revised estimate from UN 1968), over the 40 year period there was an
average improvement in life expectancy of (42.4-39.25)/40 or 0.08 years per elapsed year. This implies
life expectancy in 1930 (after 25 years) of 41.22 and in 1940 (after 35 years) of 42.05.
Instead of the UN data for 1940, Preston (1975) prefers life expectancy estimates of 36.06 (male)
and 37.25 (female), the average is 36.66; these data are from Arriaga (1968). Comparing with the earlier
UN estimates suggests a worsening of life expectancy from 1905 to 1940 of 0.07 years per elapsed year.
This would put life expectancy in 1930 at 37.40.9 We prefer the Preston estimate for 1940 as he has a
country speciﬁc source that he regards as comparable with but better than the available UN estimate.
We also prefer the calculation for 1930 that uses Preston’s 1940 estimate.
We use 37.4 for 1930 and 36.7 for 1940.
7. Canada (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1949, p. 514) gives, for 1930-32, male life expectancy of 60.0 and female life
expectancy of 62.1, with an average of 61.05; for 1940-42, it gives male life expectancy of 62.96 and
female life expectancy of 66.30, for an average of 64.63. UN 1968, p. 710, has tiny adjustments to just
the 1940-42 numbers: 62.95 male and 66.29 female, for an average of 64.62.10
Preston (1975) uses 59.09 (male) and 61.58 (female) for 1931, for an average of 60.34; the source
is Preston, Keyﬁtz, and Schoen 1972. We prefer the Preston estimate as he chooses a country speciﬁc
study over the UN estimate.
The average annual change in life expectancy from 1931 to 1941 (midpoint of 1940-42) is 0.43 years.
This implies that life expectancy in 1940 was 64.19, while in 1930 it was 59.91.
We use 59.9 for 1930 and 64.2 for 1940.
8. Chile (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1949 and 1951, p. 528) reports life expectancy as 35.4 male and 37.7 female in 1930 (average
36.55), and as 37.9 male and 39.8 female in 1940 (average 38.85); these data were also used by IVS.11
But there was a major revision of these data. UN (1961, p. 628, and 1968, p. 716) has life expectancy
of 40.40 male and 41.03 female in 1930, average of 40.72, and 40.91 male and 43.16 female in 1940,
8The table note says “for population born in Brazil” and “based on mortality rates implied from apparent
survivorship rates between censuses.”
9IVS (p. 220) gives higher estimates, but this is presumably because it only reports data for two major cities.
Male life expectancy in Rio de Janeiro 1939-41 is given as 40.77 and female life expectancy as 46.27. In Sao
Paolo for the same period male life expectancy is 46.71 and female is 51.77. IVS also gives alternative estimates
of 43.04 for both sexes (not broken out separately) for Rio in 1939-40 and 50.13 for both sexes in Sao Paolo
in 1939-40. For 1920-21, the “both sexes” life expectancy in Rio is given as 41; for Sao Paolo the equivalent
estimate is 42.67. IVS also reports life expectation for “native population”in 1890-1920 as 39.25 (both sexes).
Natives here likely means non-immigrants.
10IVS (p. 220) has very similar estimates. Male life expectancy in 1941 (“except Yukon and Northwest
Territories”) was 62.95, while female life expectancy was 66.29. The same source gives male life expectancy as
58.46 in 1931 and female life expectancy as 60.23, for an average of 59.35. For males, life expectancy was 59.32
in 1929-31 and for females it was 61.59, for an average of 60.46.
11IVS also reports “both sexes” life expectancy as 41.2 in 1939 and 38.8 in 1929-32, suggesting that mortality
ﬂuctuated considerably from year-to-year at that time.
C-4average of 42.04.12 Preston uses these revised data for 1940.
We use 40.7 for 1930 and 42.0 for 1940.
9. China (in base sample for panel only)13
No life expectancy data for mainland China are available from the UN or our other sources. We
therefore use estimates from Taiwan (Formosa) which was a province of China before 1950. Crude
death rates indicate that this is a reasonable proxy.14
UN (1968, p. 718) has life expectancy for 1926-30 as 38.76 (male) and 43.13 (female), average of
40.95. For 1936-40, the same source gives 41.08 (male) and 45.73 (female), average of 43.41. See also
United Nations (1949, p. 514, 1951, p. 530, and 1961, p. 628).
From 1928 (midpoint of 1926-30) to 1938 (midpoint 1936-40), the average annual increase in life
expectancy was 0.25. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 41.45, while in 1940 it was 43.91.
We use 41.5 for 1930 and 43.9 for 1940.
10. Colombia (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
The earliest data in our UN sources (e.g., 1968, p. 716) are for 1950-52, with life expectancy of
44.18 (male) and 45.95 (female), average of 45.07.
Preston (1975) has estimates of life expectancy of 36.04 (male) and 37.19 (female) for 1938; average
of 36.62 (his source is Arriaga).15 In the 13 years from 1938 to 1951 (midpoint of 1950-52) the average
annual increase in life expectancy was 0.65. Interpolating implies life expectancy in 1940 was 37.92.
We have not found any reasonable basis for calculating a 1930 estimate.
We use 37.9 for 1940 and have no data for 1930.
11. Costa Rica (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1968, p. 710) reports life expectancy in 1949-51 of 54.65 for males and 57.05 for females,
average of 55.85, but there is no earlier UN data and Preston does not have an estimate. However, IVS,
p. 220, reports life expectancy for both sexes (not broken out separately) of 40.69 for 1927.
Using our interpolation formula, (C1), the improvement between 1927 and 1950 (midpoint of 1949
and 1951) translates into an annual increase in life expectancy of 0.66 years, and implies that life
expectancy in 1940 was 49.26, while in 1930 it was 42.67.
We use 42.7 for 1930 and 49.3 for 1940
12. Denmark (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1951, p. 532 and 1968, p. 724) gives life expectancy for 1926-30 as 60.9 (male) and 62.6
(female), average of 61.75.16 This source also reports life expectancy for 1931-35 as 62.0 (male) and
63.8 (female), average of 62.9 (also in UN 1949, p. 516); Preston uses the 1931-35 data, but that is
probably just because he was seeking data “in the 1930s”. We prefer the 1926-30 estimates as this
allows us to interpolate (rather than extrapolate backwards).
UN (1968, p. 724) gives life expectancy for 1936-40 as 63.5 (male) and 65.8 (female), average of
64.65. The same source gives life expectancy for 1941-45 as 65.62 (male) and 67.7 (female), average
of 66.66; also in UN 1949, p. 516.17 Urlanis indicates only a small demographic eﬀect of the war in
Denmark, but we prefer the 1936-40 data in any case as they include the year 1940.
Between 1928 (midpoint of 1926-30) and 1938 (midpoint of 1936-40), the average annual increase
in life expectancy was 0.29 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 of 62.33.
Between 1938 (midpoint of 1936-40) and 1943 (midpoint of 1941-45), the average annual increase
in life expectancy was 0.4 years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 of 65.45.
12The relevant footnote says “revised to take account of estimated underregistration of births.”
13The on-line UN database has no value for life expectancy in China in 1980. We interpolate between 1970
and 1990, to get a life expectancy of 65.31.
14The crude death rate on the mainland was 16 in 1950-54 and in Taiwan it was 10.
15There is a big diﬀerence with IVS, p. 220, which for 1939-41, reports male life expectancy at 46.3 and has
n oe s t i m a t ef o rf e m a l e s .W ep r e f e rP r e s t o nb e c a u s eh eu s e sac o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc study and has data on females.
16UN (1949, p. 516) gives life expectancy for 1901-05 as 52.9 (male) and 56.2 (female); for 1911-15 as 56.2
(male) and 59.2 (female); and for 1921-25 as 60.3 (male) and 61.9 (female).
17There is a slight discrepancy with IVS (p. 220), which for Denmark “except Faroe Islands” for 1936-40,
gives male life expectancy as 63.5 and female life expectancy as 65.8. The IVS estimates for 1931-35 match
those of the UN.
C-5We use 62.3 for 1930 and 65.5 for 1940
13. Ecuador (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
We average of the estimates for Colombia (37.9 in 1940 and no data for 1930) and Peru (39.0 in
1930 and 40.6 in 1940).18
We use 39.3 for 1940 and have no estimate for 1930.
14. El Salvador (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
We use an average of the estimates for Guatemala (30.4 for 1940 and no data for 1930) and Nicaragua
(34.5 in 1940 and no data for 1930).19
We use 32.5 for 1940 and have no estimate for 1930.20
15. Finland (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1949, p. 516, 1951, p. 532, and 1968, p. 726) for 1921-30 has 50.68 (male) and
55.14 (female), average of 52.91; for 1931-40 it has 54.45 (male) and 59.55 (female), average of 57.0;
UN (1968, p. 728) for 1941-45 has 54.62 (male) and 61.14 (female), average of 57.88 (“excluding war
losses”).21 The 1931-40 and 1941-45 data are also in UN (1961, p. 632); the note indicates these
estimates exclude deaths of civilians and members of the armed forces due to military operations.22
Preston (1975) uses 54.32 (male) and 59.48 (female) from 1936-40, which is from the UN (1968, p. 726);
average of 56.9.
Between half way through 1925 (midpoint of 1921-30) and half way through 1935 (midpoint of
1931-40) there was an average annual increase in life expectancy of (57-52.91)/10, i.e., 0.41 years. This
implies life expectancy in 1930 was 1.84+52.91=54.75.
Between 1938 (midpoint of 1936-40) and 1943 (midpoint of 1941-45) there was an average annual
increase in life expectancy of (57.88-56.9)/5, i.e., 0.20. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 57.3.
(Alternatively, if we extrapolate using the earlier rate of change in life expectancy, this would imply life
expectancy in 1940 of 57.72).
We use 54.8 for 1930 and 57.3 for 1940.
16. France (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 534, 1968, p. 726) for 1928-33 has 54.30 (male) and 59.02 (female),
average of 56.66. For 1933-38 the same source has 55.94 (male) and 61.64 (female), average of 58.79.23
There are no data for exactly 1940 but for 1946-49 the UN (1968, p. 726) gives life expectancy as 61.86
(males) and 67.43 (females), average of 64.65.
The midpoint of 1928-33 is halfway through 1930 and so we use the 1928-33 data for our 1930
estimate. Over the 12 years from halfway through 1935 (mid-point of 1933-38) to halfway through 1947
(midpoint of 1946-49) there was an average increase of 0.49 years of life expectancy per elapsed year.
This implies life expectancy in 1940, assuming a linear trend, was 60.02.
Preston (1975) uses UN data of 55.12 (male) and 60.33 (female) from 1928-38; average of 57.73.
We prefer the 1928-33, 1933-38 and 1946-49 UN data as they cover narrower windows that are closer
to 1930 (and 1940).
We use 56.7 for 1930 and 60.0 for 1940.
17. Germany (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 534, and 1968, p. 726) for 1924-26 of 55.97 (male) and 58.82 (female),
average of 57.40. The same source for 1932-34 has life expectancy of 59.86 (male) and 62.81 (female),
18In 1935-39, the crude death rate in Ecuador was 24.6, while in Colombia it was 16.2 and in Peru it was
15.5. However, by 1950-54, Ecuador’s crude death rate was much closer to that of Colombia and Peru (within
3 per 1,000).
19In 1935-39, the crude death rate in El Salvador was 21.1, while in Guatemala it was 26.8 and in Nicaragua
it was 15.0.
20The earliest estimate in the UN sources is UN (1968, p. 710), which has life expectancy estimates for
El Salvador in 1949-51 of 49.94 (male) and 52.40 (female). This implies a large, but plausible jump in life
expectancy during the 1940s.
21These data are also in IVS (p. 222).
22UN (1949, p. 516) also has life expectancy for 1901-10 of 45.33 (male) and 48.1 (female), and for 1911-20
it has 43.41 (male) and 49.12 (female).
23The IVS (p. 220) has similar data, with slight discrepancies at the second decimal place.
C-6average of 61.34; Preston and IVS use the same data. Interpolating between these two periods, over 8
years (1925 to 1933) there was an average annual increase of 0.49 years. This implies life expectancy
in 1930 was 59.85.
The next available German data are for 1946-47, with male life expectancy at 57.72 and female
life expectancy at 63.44 (UN, 1968, p. 728), but these data must large large eﬀects of the recently
ended war (Urlanis). There are also data for 1949-51, with life expectancy at 64.56 (male) and 68.48
(female), average of 66.52.24 We therefore prefer to interpolate between 1932-34 and 1949-51 to obtain
an estimate for 1940. Over the 17 year period from 1933 (midpoint of 1932-34) to 1950 (midpoint of
1949-51) there was an average annual life expectancy improvemen of 0.30.25 This implies, with a linear
trend, that life expectancy in 1940 was 63.47.
We use 59.9 for 1930 and 63.5 for 1940.
18. Greece (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1968, p. 728) has life expectancy for 1926-30 of 44.95 (male) and 47.46 (female), average of
46.21.26 For 1940 the same source puts life expectancy at 52.94 (male) and 55.80 (female), average of
54.37; Preston also uses these data.
In the 12 years between 1928 (midpoint of 1926-30) and 1940, there was an annual average increase
in life expectancy of 0.68 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 47.57.
We use 47.6 for 1930 and 54.4 for 1940.
19. Guatemala (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1957, section following p. p.564) reports life expectancy for Guatemala in 1921 as 28.22 years
(male and female).
From United Nations (1949, p. 514, and 1951), covering 1939-41, we have life expectancy estimates
of 35.97 for males and 37.09 for females; average of 36.53, but these are not for the whole country.27
The UN (1968, p. 710) reports data for the whole of Guatemala only from 1949-51.
Preston (1975) uses life expectancy of 30.25 (male) and 30.46 (female) for 1940; average of 30.36
(from Arriaga). We prefer his estimates as they appear to cover the whole country, and also because
Preston choose Arriaga’s estimates over the UN numbers (which were available to him).
We use 30.4 for 1940 and do not have an estimate for 1930.
20. Honduras (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
Based on crude death rates, we use the average of Guatemala (30.4 for 1940 and no data for 1930)
and Nicaragua (34.5 in 1940 and no data for 1930).28
We use 32.5 for 1940 and have no estimate for 1930.
21. India (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
The United Nations (1949, p. 516, and 1951, p. 530) for 1921-31 gives male life expectancy of
26.91 and female life expectancy of 26.56, average of 26.74 (this is for “pre-partition India, including
Burma”); these numbers are also used in IVS (p. 220), which says they are for “British India”.29
Preston (1975) uses 26.9 (male) and 26.6 (female) from 1931 data; average of 26.75. His source is
Dandekar (1972) a country-speciﬁc source (although the data are obviously almost identical to those
from the UN for 1921-31.) Between the 1921-31 estimate (midpoint 1926) and the 1931 estimate,
there was an average annual increase in life expectancy of 0.002 years. Interpolating, this implies life
expectancy in 1930 was 26.75 (to 2 signiﬁcant ﬁgures).
UN (1961, p. 630 and 1968, pp. 718-720) has life expectancy for 1941-50 of 32.45 (male) and
31.66 (female), average of 32.06. Using this for the midpoint, halfway through 1945, the average annual
24The immediate post-war data are divided by the UN into Eastern Germany, Federal Republic of Germany,
Berlin and West Berlin. Here we are using the numbers for the Federal Republic.
25This is a lower annual increase in life expectancy than in France, for example. But given the diﬀerential
eﬀects of the war (see Urlanis), this does not seem unreasonable.
26From IVS (p. 220) male life expectancy in 1928 was 49.09 and female life expectancy was 50.89.
27The note says ”Department of Guatemala only”.
28In 1935-39, the crude death rate in Honduras was 16.2, while in Guatemala it was 26.8 and in Nicaragua it
was 15.0.
29The same 1949 source gives the following data for 1891-1901, 23.63 (male) and 23.96 (female); and for
1901-1911, 22.59 and 23.31.
C-7improvement in life expectancy was 0.37 years over the 14.5 years after 1931. This implies life expectancy
in 1940 was 30.05.
We use 26.8 for 1930 and 30.0 for 1940.
22. Indonesia (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
There are no data in the UN Demographic Yearbooks or the IVS for Indonesia. Preston uses 32.5
(male) and 32.5 (female) for 1930-35; average of 32.5 (from a country-speciﬁc source, Nitisastro, 1970).
The UN on-line database gives 37.5 for average life expectancy in 1950-55. Using this for halfway
through 1952 (the midpoint) implies that the average annual life expectancy increase in the 19.5 years
after 1933 was 0.26. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 34.29.
We use 34.3 for 1940 and have no estimate for 1930.
23. Ireland (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1968, p. 730) has life expectancy in 1925-27 as 57.37 (male) and 57.93 (female), average of
57.65. The same source has life expectancy in 1935-37 of 58.20 (male) and 59.62 (female), average of
58.91; Preston uses these data.30 Taking the midpoints of these windows, between 1926 and 1936 there
was an average annual increase in life expectancy of 0.13. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was
58.15.31
UN (1961, p. 634, and 1968, p. 730) for 1940-42 has 59.01 (male) and 61.02 (female), for an
average of 60.02. Between 1941 (midpoint of 1940-42) and 1936, there was an annual average increase
in life expectancy of 0.22 years, implying that life expectancy in 1940 was 59.80. There were no large
demographic eﬀects of the war on Ireland.
We use 58.2 for 1930 and 59.8 for 1940.
24. Italy (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 534 and 1968, p. 730) for 1921-22 has life expectancy of 49.27 (male)
and 50.75 (female), average of 50.01. The same source for 1930-32 has 53.76 (male) and 56.0 (female),
average of 54.88; and for 1935-37 it has female (only) life expectancy of 57.49.32 After that, the next
available data are for 1950-53, when life expectancy is given as 63.75 (male) and 67.23 (female), average
of 65.49.
Preston (1975) uses the UN’s data, but has an estimate of male life expectancy which is not UN
(1968).33 His estimates are 55.25 (male) and 57.49 (female) for 1935-37; average of 56.37. Using this for
the midpoint of 1936 and assuming a linear trend to halfway through 1951 (midpoint of 1950-53) gives
an annual average improvement in life expectancy over 15.5 years of 0.59. This implies life expectancy
in 1940 was 58.72.
Between halfway through 1921 (midpoint of 1921-22) and 1931, there was an annual average increase
in life expectancy of 0.51 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 54.37.
We use 54.4 for 1930 and 58.7 for 1940.
25. Korea (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 530 and 1968, p. 720) for 1938 gives male life expectancy of 47.20 and
female life expectancy of 50.59, for an average of 48.9. Korea is not in Preston or IVS.
The UN’s on-line database has an estimate of life expectancy (average for male and female combined)
of 47.5 for 1950-55. This estimate is presumably aﬀected by the Korean war.34
In the 14.5 years between 1938 and halfway through 1952, the average annual decrease in life
expectancy was 0.1 years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 48.7.
We use 48.7 for 1940 and do not have an estimate for 1930.
30From IVS (p. 222), life expectancy was 59.01 (male) and 61.02 (female) in 1940-42, 58.20 (male) and 59.62
(female) in 1935-37, and 57.37 (male) and 57.93 (female) in 1925-27.
31United Nations (1951, p. 534) has somewhat diﬀerent estimates. For 1921-30 this source has 56.2 (male)
and 61 (female), average of 58.6; and for 1931-40 it has 60.9 (male) and 65.6 (female), average of 63.25. However,
these estimates are not repeated in UN (1968), so we presume they were revised and we prefer the numbers in
UN (1968).
32IVS (p. 222) also reports the 1930-32 data.
33IVS, p. 222, also only has female life expectancy.
34The next estimate, from UN (1968, p. 720) is for 1955-60 — 51.12 (male) and 53.73 (female), average of
52.43. But this is quite far into the treatment period, according to our reading of the history.
C-826. Malaysia (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
Based on crude death rates, we use the estimate of Thailand and adjust our standard errors for
clustering accordingly.35
We use 42.6 for 1940 and do not have an estimate for 1930.
27. Mexico (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1968, p. 712) has life expectancy in 1930 as 35.45 (male) and 37.08 (female), average of 36.27.
For 1940, the same source reports life expectancy as 57.96 (male) and 40.42 (female). But the 1940
male datapoint must be a typo — for all other ages, the estimates are essentially unchanged from 1935
(male life expectancy of 38.94); probably the estimate for males should be 37.96, giving an average of
43.58 . From IVS (p. 222) male life expectancy at birth was 37.19 in 1929-1933 and 32.44 in 1930.
Preston (1975) uses 38.94 (male) and 41.89 (female) for 1935; average of 40.42 (from the UN). We
prefer the UN estimates for the exact dates of 1930 and 1940.
We use 36.3 for 1930 and 43.6 for 1940.
28. Myanmar, previously known as Burma (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
The UN (1968, p. 718) reports life expectancy in Burma for 1921-31 as 30.61 (male) and 31.0
(female), average of 30.81. The same source gives life expectancy in 1954 as 40.8 (male) and 43.8
(female), average of 42.30.36 Interpolating between 1926 (midpoint of 1921-31) to 1954, this yields an
average annual increase of 0.41 additional years, and implies that life expectancy in 1930 was 32.45 and
in 1940 was 36.56.
We use 32.5 for 1930 and 36.6 for 1940.
29. Netherlands (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 536, and 1968, p. 732) for 1921-30 has 61.9 (male) and 63.5 (female),
average of 62.7; for 1931-40 it has 65.5 (male) and 67.2 (female), average of 65.6 (“excluding war losses”);
IVS (p. 222) has very similar estimates and Preston uses exactly these numbers.37 For 1947-49, UN
(1968, p. 732) gives life expectancy as 69.40 (male) and 71.50 (female), average of 70.45.
From halfway through 1925 (midpoint of 1921-30) to halfway through 1935 (midpoint of 1931-40),
there was an annual average increase in life expectancy of 0.29 years. This implies life expectancy in
1930 was 63.9.
From halfway through 1935 (midpoint of 1931-40) to 1948 (midpoint of 1947-49), there was an
annual average increase in life expectancy of 0.39 years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 67.35.
We use 63.9 in 1930 and 67.4 in 1940.
30. New Zealand (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 538 and 1968, p. 740) has life expectancy for 1925-27 of 63.99 (male) and
66.57 (female), average of 65.28; and for 1931 of 65.04 (male) and 67.88 (female), average of 66.46. For
1934-38, the same source gives life expectancy as 65.46 (male) and 68.45 (female), average of 66.96 (IVS
uses these numbers), while for 1950-52 life expectancy was 67.19 (male) and 71.29 (female), average of
69.24.38
Between 1926 (midpoint 1925-27) and 1931, the average annual increase in life expectancy was 0.25
years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 66.21.
Between 1935 (midpoint of 1934-38) and 1951 (midpoint of 1950-52), the average annual increase
in life expectancy was 0.14. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 67.67.
We use 66.2 in 1930 and 67.7 in 1940.
31. Nicaragua (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
Early data for this country are not in the UN Yearbooks or IVS. However, Preston (1975) has life
expectancy of 33.88 (male) and 35.09 (female) for 1940 (from Arriaga), for an average of 34.49.
We use 34.5 in 1940 and have no estimate for 1930.
35In West Malaysia (the Malay Peninsula), crude death rates were 20.8 in 1935-39; in Thailand during the
same time period they were 16.4.
36The UN’s on-line database gives life expectancy for 1950-55 as 36.9 (both sexes).
37The same source gives male life expectancy (only) “exc l u d i n gw a rl o s s e s ”o f6 5 . 7 for 1931-40, indicating
that the war losses adjustment is very small.
38Preston has for 1934-38, 65.04 (male) and 68.45 (female); but the male number seems to be an error
(compared with UN 1951).
C-932. Norway (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 536 and 1968, p. 732) for 1921/22-1930/31 has 60.98 (male) and 63.84
(female), for an average of 62.41; IVS also uses these data. The same source gives life expectancy in
1931/32-1940/41 as 64.08 (male) and 67.55 (female), average of 65.82; Preston uses these data. In UN
(1968, p. 732), life expectancy in 1945-48 was 67.76 (male) and 71.68 (female), average of 69.72.
From 1926 (midpoint of 1921/22-1930/31) to 1936 (midpoint of 1931/32-1940/41), the average
annual increase in life expectancy was 0.34. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 63.77.
From 1936 (midpoint of 1931/32-1940/41) to halfway through 1946 (midpoint of 1945-48), the
average annual increase in life expectancy was 0.37. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 67.31.
We use 63.8 in 1930 and 67.3 in 1940.
33. Pakistan (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
We use the same estimates as for India. Standard errors in all regressions are clustered by unit of
observation for original life expectancy data (i.e., pre-independence India) to account for this.
We use 26.8 for 1930 and 30.0 for 1940.
34. Panama (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
From United Nations (1949, p. 514, and 1968, p. 712), covering 1941-43, we have life expectancy of
50.54 for males and 53.46 for females, average of 52.0. Preston (1975), in contrast, has life expectancy
of 41.50 (male) and 43.26 (female) for 1940, average of 42.38, from Arriaga. We prefer Preston’s number
as it is for exactly 1940 and from a country speciﬁc source that he preferred to the UN data (which was
available to him).
For 1940 we use 42.4 and for 1930 we have no estimate.
35. Paraguay (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
Based on crude death rates, we average the estimates of neighboring Argentina (52.6 for 1930 and
56.5 for 1940).and Brazil (37.4 for 1930 and 36.7 for 1940).39
We use 45.0 for 1930 and 46.6 for 1940.
36. Peru (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
There are no data in the UN Yearbooks or in Preston. However, IVS (p. 222), which gives “both
sexes” life expectancy (for the city of Lima) as 38.97 in 1933-35. From the on-line UN data, life
expectancy in 1950-55 was 43.9. Interpolating between 1934 (midpoint of 1933-35) to half way through
1952 (midpoint of 1950-55) implies an average annual increase of 0.27 years. This implies life expectancy
in 1940 was 40.61.
We use 40.6 in 1940 and do not have an estimate for 1930.
37. Philippines (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1968, p722) has life expectancy of 25.17 (male) and 26.07 (female) in 1918, average of 25.62;
it also has life expectancy of 44.80 (male) and 47.72 (female) for 1938; average of 46.26 (these data are
also used by Preston). UN (1961, p. 630 and 1968, p. 722) has male life expectancy of 48.81 and female
life expectancy of 53.36 in 1946-49, for an average of 51.09.
Interpolating from 1918 to 1938, there was an annual average increase of 1.02 years. This implies
life expectancy in 1930 was 38.0.
From 1938 to halfway through 1947 (midpoint of 1946-49), there was an annual average increase in
life expectancy of 0.51 years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 47.28.
We use 38.0 for 1930 and 47.3 for 1940.
38. Portugal (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1951, p. 536, and 1968, p. 734) for 1939-42 has 48.58 (male) and 52.82 (female),
average of 50.7; IVS uses these data (“including the Azores and Madeira islands”). For 1949-52, UN
(1968, p. 734) has life expectancy of 55.52 (male) and 60.50 (female), average of 58.01.
Between halfway through 1940 (midpoint 1939-42) and halfway through 1950 (midpoint 1949-52),
there was an average annual increase in life expectancy of 0.73 years. This implies life expectancy in
1940, extrapolating backwards from 1939-42 to 1940, was 50.33.
We use 50.3 for 1940 and do not have an estimate for 1930.
39In 1950-54, the ﬁrst years for which data are available, crude death rates in Paraguay were 11.2, while in
Argentina they were 8.8 and in Brazil they were 20.6 (the latter is for 1940-54).
C-1039. Spain (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
United Nations (1968, p. 734) for 1930 has life expectancy of 48.38 (male) and 51.60 (female),
average of 49.99; Preston uses very similar data from the UN for 1930-31. The same source gives life
expectancy for 1940 as 47.12 (male) and 53.24 (female), average of 50.18 (presumably reﬂecting the
eﬀects of the civil war).
We use 50.0 for 1930 and 50.2 for 1940.
40. Sri Lanka (in base sample for panel and long diﬀerences)
UN (1968, p. 718) has life expectancy for 1920-22 of 32.72 (male) and 30.67 (female), average of
31.70. The same source has life expectancy of 46.79 (male) and 44.72 (female) for 1945-47, average of
45.76.
Interpolating from 1921 to 1946, there was an average annual increase of 0.56 years of life expectancy.
This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 36.76, while in 1940 it was 42.34.
We use 36.8 in 1930 and 42.3 in 1940.
41. Sweden
United Nations (1951, p. 536) has data for: 1921-30, 60.97 (male) and 63.16 (female), average of
62.07; for 1931-40, 63.76 (male) and 66.13 (female), average of 64.95; for 1941-45, 67.06 (male) and
69.71 (female), average of 68.39. The UN (1968, p. 734) gives life expectancy as 64.30 (male) and
66.92 (female) in 1936-40, average of 65.61; these data are also used by the IVS. Sweden did not have
signiﬁcant war losses (Urlanis).
Preston (1975) uses 62.02 (male) and 64.11 (female) for the narrower window of 1928-32; average
of 63.07 (from Keyﬁtz and Flieger). We use these data for 1930 as that is the exact midpoint of his
window and because Preston preferred these numbers to estimates from the UN.
Between 1938 (midpoint of 1936-40) and 1943 (midpoint of 1941-45), there was an average annual
incrase in life expectancy of 0.56 years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 66.72.
We use 63.0 in 1930 and 66.7 in 1940.
42. Switzerland
UN (1968, p. 736) has life expectancy for 1920-21 as 54.48 (male) and 57.70 (female), average of
56.09. United Nations (1951, p. 536) has life expectancy for 1929-32 as 59.17 (male) and 63.05 (female),
average of 61.11 (Preston uses this estimate); for 1933-37 as 60.7 (male) and 64.6 (female), average of
62.65; for 1939-44 as 62.68 (male) and 66.96 (female), average of 64.82. Switzerland had no signiﬁcant
war losses (Urlanis). IVS also uses these data.
Between halfway through 1920 (midpoint of 1920-21) and halfway through 1930 (midpoint 1929-32),
the average annual increase in life expectancy was 0.50 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was
60.86.
Between 1935 (midpoint 1933-37) and half way through 1942 (midpoint 1939-44), the average annual
increase in life expectancy was 0.29. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 64.10.
We use 60.9 for 1930 and 64.1 for 1940.
43. Thailand
Preston and the IVS have no data. United Nations (1949, p. 516 and 1951, p. 530) gives life
expectancy at birth for Siam, 1937-38, as 36.73 for male and 43.3 for female, average of 40.02. These
data are only “For Bangkok municipal area.”40
The next available data are for 1947-48 — UN (1968, p. 722) gives life expectancy for that period
as 48.69 (male) and 51.90 (female), average of 50.30. In the 10 years between halfway through 1937
(midpoint of 1937-38) and halfway through 1947 (midpoint of 1947-48), the average annual increase in
life expectancy was 1.03 years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 42.59.
We use 42.6 for 1940 and do not have an estimate for 1930.
44. United Kingdom (England and Wales)41
UN (1968, p. 736) has life expectancy for 1920-22 of 55.62 (male) and 59.58 (female), average of
57.60. United Nations (1951, p. 536, and 1968, p. 736) has life expectancy for 1930-32 as 58.74 (male)
40UN (1961, p. 632) has life expectancy for 1947-48 of 48.69 (male) and 51.9 (female), for an average of 50.3.
41We do not use the data for Scotland or Northern Ireland.
C-11and 62.88 (female), average of 60.81 (Preston uses these data); and for 1948, 66.39 (male) and 71.15
(female), average of 68.77.
Between 1921 (midpoint of 1920-22) and 1931 (midpoint of 1930-32), the average annual increase
in life expectancy was 0.32 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 60.49.
Interpolating between 1931 (midpoint of 1930-32) and 1948, there was an average annual increase
in life expectancy of 0.47 years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 65.02.
We use 60.5 for 1930 and 65.0 for 1940.
45. USA
United Nations (1951, p. 528, and 1968, p. 714) gives 57.71 (male) and 60.99 (female), average
59.35, for 1929-31 and 61.60 (male) and 65.89 (female) for 1939-41, average 63.75, (the 1939-41 data
are also in UN 1949, p. 514).42
Preston uses 59.2 (male) and 62.8 (female), average of 61.00, for 1929-38 (from US oﬃcial statistics).
However, his window is so broad that we prefer the UN data, for which the midpoints are the exact
dates of interest.
We use 59.4 for 1930 and 63.8 for 1940.
46. Uruguay
There are no life expectancy estimates in our sources. However, from the UN (1967) we know that
crude death rates were quite similar to those in a neighbor, Argentina.43 We therefore use the life
expectancy estimates of Argentina (52.6 for 1930 and 56.5 for 1940).
We use 52.6 for 1930 and 56.5 for 1940.
47. Venezuela
Preston reports life expectancy of 33.29 (male) and 34.47 (female) for 1936; average of 33.88. In
the UN on-line database, for 1950-55, life expectancy is 55.1 (average of both sexes).
Between 1936 and halfway through 1952, the average annual increase in life expectancy was 1.29
years. This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 39.02.
We use 33.9 for 1940 and have no estimate for 1930.
4 Life Expectancy Data by Country in Eastern Europe
For robustness checks, we include the available data from Eastern Europe, which includes six additional
countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic), Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR (Rus-
sian Federation).
1. Bulgaria
United Nations (1949, p. 516, and 1951, p. 532) for 1925-28 gives life expectancy of 45.92 (male)
and 46.64 (female), for an average of 53.55 (“excluding Southern Dobruja” says a note in UN 1951;
there is no note in UN 1949); IVS uses these data.44 The UN on-line database for 1950-55 reports life
expectancy for both sexes as 64.1. Bulgaria is not in Preston.
From halfway through 1926 (midpoint of 1925-28) to halfway through 1952 (midpoint of 1950-55),
the average annual increase in life expectancy was 0.41 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was
54.97, while in 1940 it was 59.09.
We use 56.0 for 1930 and 59.1 for 1940.
2. Czechoslovakia45
United Nations (1949, p. 516, and 1951, p. 532) for the period 1929-32 has life expectancy of 51.92
(male) and 55.18 (female), for an average of 53.55 (“including area ceded to USSR in 1947; excluding
42UN (1949, p. 514) has male life expectancy in 1900-1902 as 47.88 and female life expectancy as 50.70. For
1909-1911, it has 49.86 and 53.24. But these data are only “for the ten death-registration States of 1900.” IVS
reports life expectancy broken down by “white,” “negro,” and “nonwhite.”
43In 1935-39, crude death rates were 11.1 in Uruguay and 11.5 in Argentina.
44For 1899-1902, UN (1949) gives male life expectancy as 45.39 and female life expectancy as 40.33.
45There is a gap in the UN’s on-line database, we ﬁll this by assuming that life expectancy was unchanged
between 1960 and 1970; both assumed equal to 69.76.
C-12territory ceded by Hungary in 1947” says the 1951 note); IVS uses these data.46 Preston (1975) uses
54.92 (male) and 58.66 (female) for 1937, for an average of 56.79 (from the UN). From UN (1968, p.
724), life expectancy in 1949-51 was 60.93 (male) and 65.53 (female), for an average of 63.23.
From halfway through 1930 (midpoint 1929-32) to 1937, the average annual increase in life ex-
pectancy was 0.5 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930, extrapolating backwards half a year, was
53.05.
From 1937 to 1950 (midpoint 1949-51), life expectancy increased 0.5 years on average per year.
This implies life expectancy in 1940 was 58.29.
We use 53.1 for 1930 and 58.3 for 1940.
3. Hungary
UN (1968, p. 728) gives life expectancy in 1920-21 as 40.4 (male) and 42.6 (female), average of
41.50. Preston (1975) uses 48.27 (male) and 51.34 (female) for 1930-31, for an average of 49.81 (from
the UN).47 United Nations (1951, p. 534) gives life expectancy for 1941 as 54.92 (male) and 58.22
(female), average of 56.57 (“including territory ceded to Czechoslovakia in 1947”). These estimates are
repeated in UN (1961, p. 634 and 1968, p. 728), but they are marked as “provisional.”
Between halfway through 1920 (midpoint of 1920-21) and halfway through 1930 (midpoint of 1930-
31), the annual average increase in life expectancy was 0.83 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930
was 49.39.
Between halfway through 1930 and 1941, life expectancy increased by 0.62 years on average. This
implies life expectancy in 1940 was 55.95.
We use 49.4 for 1930 and 56.0 for 1940.
4. Poland
United Nations (1949, p. 520, 1951, p. 536 and 1968, p. 734) for 1931-32 has 48.2 (male) and 51.4
(female), average of 49.8; Preston and IVS use these data. For 1948, UN (1968, p. 734) reports life
expectancy as 55.6 (male) and 62.5 (female), average of 59.05.
Between halfway through 1931 (midpoint of 1931-32) and 1948, there was an annual average increase
in life expectancy of 0.62 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930, extrapolating back 18 months,
was 48.88, and that life expectancy in 1940 was 55.07.
We use 48.9 for 1930 and 55.1 for 1940.
5. Romania
UN (1968, p. 734) reports life expectancy in 1932 for both sexes as 42.01. The UN’s online database
for 1950-55 reports life expectancy as 61.1.
Between 1932 and halfway through 1952 (midpoint 1950-55) there was an annual average increase
in life expectancy of 0.93 years. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 40.15, while in 1940 it was
49.45.
We use 40.2 for 1930 and 49.5 for 1940.
6. Russia (“European part” of the USSR)48
United Nations (1951, p. 538 and 1968, p. 740) for 1926-27 has 41.93 (male) and 46.79 (female),
average of 44.36; IVS uses these data.49 The on-line UN database has life expectancy for both sexes in
1950-55 of 67.3.
From halfway through 1926 (midpoint of 1926-27) to halfway through 1952 (midpoint of 1950-55),
the average annual increase in life expectancy was 0.88. This implies life expectancy in 1930 was 47.44,
while in 1940 it was 56.24.
We use 47.4 for 1930 and 56.2 for 1940.
46UN (1949) gives life expectancy for males of 38.89 in 1899-1902 and for females of 41.71 in the same period.
47IVS (p. 222) has very diﬀerent numbers for 1930-31: 59.77 males and 63.74 for females.
48T h e r ei sag a pi nt h eU No n - l i n ed a t a b a s ew h i c hw eﬁll by assuming that life expectancy was unchanged
between 1960 and 1970.
49T h es a m es o u r c eg i v e ss i m i l a r ,b u ts l i g h t l yd i ﬀerent numbers, for the RSFSR, Siberia, Ukrainian SSR and
the Byelorussian SSR. For 1896-97, the same source has 41.93 (male) and 46.79 (female), average of 44.36.
C-135 Additional Life Expectancy Data
Our sources provide life expectancy data for some additional countries, but we are not able to include
them in our sample because we are currently missing other data (typically GDP, but sometimes popu-
lation). For example, Preston (1975) has data for the Dominican Republic, Iceland and Japan.50 IVS
has data on Estontia and Latvia. The UN Demographic Yearbook has data on British Guiana, Cyprus,
Jamaica, Iceland and Puerto Rico.
6A f r i c a n D a t a
There are only limited data on life expectancy in Africa south of the Sahara before 1950. For Angola,
UN (1961, p. 622), reports “both sexes” life expectancy of 35 in 1940. For Mozambique in 1940, the
same source gives “both sexes” life expectancy of 45 in 1940 (speciﬁcally, this is “African population ...
living according to tribal customs.”) The UN (1961, p. 622) reports both sexes life expectancy as 38 in
1948 for Ghana. For Mauritius, 1942-46, this source gives male life expectancy as 32.25 and female life
expectancy as 33.83.
Kuczynski (1948) contains a great deal of qualitative description of the disease burden, particularly
for West Africa. His more limited information for East Africa suggests the disease burden may have been
less, but his evidence is not conclusive. Overall, in terms of the mix of diseases, his evidence suggests
that Africa is very similar to India around 1940, and we assume the same distribution of diseases in
Africa as in India to calculate predicted mortality.51
Using our global mortality instrument does not require any such assumption, as in this case we
take predicted mortality from a global average (however, we cannot add Africa to the calculation of
that average due to lack of data.) For the sample including Africa, this instrument should therefore be
preferred.
7C a u s e s o f D e a t h
Detailed breakdowns of causes of death, by country, are used as follows for our base sample. IVS
here refer to Table 20 of International Vital Statistics (beginning on p.174). In some cases this source
indicates when the sample is not national and we repeat that indication here. League of Nations refers
to the data republished by World Health Organization (1951); this reports data for 1939-46 and we use
the information for 1940 or nearest available year.52
1. Argentina, IVS for 1936
2. Australia, IVS for 1940 (“excluding aboriginals”)
3. Austria, IVS for 1938
4. Bangladesh, same as for India
5. Belgium, IVS for 1940
6. Brazil, IVS for 1940 (“21 cities”)
7. Canada, IVS for 1940 (“excluding Yukon and N.W.T. [North West Territories]”)
8. Chile, IVS for 1940
9. China, League of Nations
50Japan’s data are problematic because the country was at war for most of the 1930s, and this had a potentially
signiﬁcant eﬀect on life expectancy.
51Controversially, this implies that the burden of malaria was the same as in India. It also implies that African
malaria was not of a qualitatively diﬀerent nature (e.g., there are some who argue it was impossible to eradicate
African malaria using the technologies of the 1940s/1950s). However, as we are missing population and GDP
data for Africa before 1950, this assumption does not much aﬀect our estimates.
52The League of Nations reports death by disease in cities (with the number of cities varying by country);
w ec o n s t r u c ta nu n w e i g h t e da v e r a g eo fd e a t hr a t e sb yd i s e ase across all available cities. City level data are also
available for places where we have country estimates of death by disease, and we have checked that the two sets
of estimates are similar.
C-1410. Colombia, IVS for 1940
11. Costa Rica, IVS for 1940
12. Denmark, IVS for 1940
13. Ecuador, League of Nations
14. El Salvador, IVS for 1940
15. Finland, IVS for 1940
16. France, IVS for 1940
17. Germany, IVS for 1938
18. Greece, IVS for 1938
19. Guatemala, IVS for 1943
20. Honduras, League of Nations
21. India, League of Nations
22. Indonesia, League of Nations
23. Ireland, IVS for 1940
24. Italy, IVS for 1940
25. Korea, League of Nations
26. Malaysia, League of Nations
27. Mexico, IVS for 1940
28. Myanmar (Burma),
29. Netherlands, IVS for 1940
30. New Zealand, IVS for 1940 (“excluding Maoris”)
31. Nicaragua, League of Nations
32. Norway, IVS for 1940
33. Pakistan, same as India
34. Panama, League of Nations
35. Paraguay, League of Nations
36. Peru, IVS for 1943 (“excluding jungle population”)
37. Philippines, League of Nations
38. Portugal, League of Nations
39. Spain, IVS for 1940
40. Sri Lanka, League of Nations
41. Sweden, IVS for 1940
42. Switerland, IVS for 1940
43. Thailand, League of Nations
44. United Kingdom (England and Wales), IVS for 1940
45. USA, IVS for 1940, League of Nations
46. Uruguay, IVS for 1940, League of Nations
47. Venezuela, IVS for 1940 (“excluding tribal Indians”)
For Eastern Europe we use the following sources:
1. Bulgaria, IVS for 1940 (“towns”)
2. Czechoslovakia, IVS for 1937
3. Hungary, IVS for 1940
4. Poland, League of Nations
5. Romania, IVS for 1939
6. Russia/Soviet Union, League of Nations
For other death by disease data (in our extended sample), we use IVS for Egypt in 1940 (“Health
Bureau Areas”) and, where relevant, for South Africa, IVS for 1939 (“Europeans”). For all other
countries, we use the League of Nations.53
53We do not use data from IVS for the following countries (because other data issues preclude us from including
these countries in our samples): Iceland, IVS for 1940; Japan, IVS for 1940; Lithuania, IVS for 1939; Northern
Ireland, IVS for 1940; and Scotland, IVS for 1940.
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Predicted Mortality  -0.33 -0.41 -0.34 -0.45 -0.34 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Number of observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283
Number of countries 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
Panel B
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Predicted Mortality  -0.45 -0.57 -0.47 -0.54 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.46 -0.46
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Number of observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
OLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Panel 
A uses data from each 10 years in the indicated period, e.g., 1940-1980 is an unbalanced panel for 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980; Panel B 
uses data from a balanced panel for just the start and end year indicated. Dependent variables: log life expectancy at birth. Independent variable: 
predicted mortality per 100 per annum. Base sample is countries for which we have disease data. Measure of predicted mortality in column 1 is 
baseline estimate, based on deaths from 15 infectious diseases. Other columns drop individual diseases from calculation of predicted mortality, as 
indicated in column heading.
Base Sample
Appendix Table C1
First Stage Estimates: Importance of Disease Composition
Diseases used to calculate predicted mortality are indicated in each column
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A
Log Life Expectancy -1.43 -1.57 -1.42 -2.13 -1.76 -0.91 -1.26 -0.89 -1.05 -0.91 -1.23
(0.64) (0.54) (0.63) (1.52) (0.94) (1.37) (0.49) (0.39) (0.47) (0.55) (1.02)
p-value for Year Dummies x  [0.003] [0.26]
   Institutions or Initial GDP per 
   working age population
Number of observations 234 266 264 179 234 230 138 234 234 187 140
Number of countries 47 47 53 36 47 46 46 47 47 47 47
No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads No leads 10 year lead 20 year lead 30 year lead 40 year lead
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1930 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1980
Just 1940 and 
1970
Just 1940 and 
1960
Panel B
Log Life Expectancy -1.35 -1.61 -1.33 -2.43 -1.82 -1.87 -1.20 -1.17 -1.18 -1.02 -1.14
(0.63) (0.62) (0.61) (1.30) (0.88) (1.39) (0.57) (0.62) (0.77) (0.79) (1.16)
Post year dummy x -0.08 -0.16
   Institutions or Initial GDP per  (0.07) (0.37)
   working age population
Number of observations 92 92 104 70 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Number of countries 46 46 52 35 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. Panel A is unbalanced 
panel with one observation per decade. Panel B is long-difference specification with observations for only the beginning and end dates. Dependent variable in both 
panels is log GDP per working age population. Independent variable in both panels is log life expectancy at birth. In columns 1-6 and 8-11, log life expectancy is 
instrumented by predicted mortality (baseline instrument), and in column 7 it is instrumented global mortality. First stages are in Table 5. In columns 1-7, the 
dependent and independent variables are for the same time period; in columns 8-11, the dependent variable is t+10, t+20 etc., as indicated, while the independent 
variable is at time t. Columns 5 and 6 include year dummies interacted with: institutions, in column 5, as average of constraint on executive in 1950, 1960, and 1970 
from Polity IV, where scores range from 1 to 7 and non-independent countries are assigned score of 1; and initial GDP per working age population, in column 6, is 




The Effect of Life Expectancy on Log GDP per population of working age: 2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Base Sample
Baseline instrument ρ=0.4  ρ=0.45  ρ=0.5  ρ=0.55  ρ=0.6  ρ=0.65  ρ=0.7  ρ=0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Dependent variable is--
Transformed Log Life Expectancy -1.98 -2.01 -2.05 -2.10 -2.15 -2.22 -2.31 -2.44
(0.97) (1.03) (1.12) (1.22) (1.36) (1.54) (1.79) (2.15)
Panel B: Dependent variable is--
Predicted Mortality -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
R-squared 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.71 0.64 0.55 0.45
Number of observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
Number of countries 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, 
in parentheses. Unbalanced panel with one observation per decade. In columns 1 through 8, transformed variables are 
defined as x(t)-ρx(t-1), where value of ρ is indicated in the column heading. Second stage regression is in panel A, 
instrument is predicted mortality, and corresponding first stage is shown in panel B.
Dependent variable indicated for each panel separately
Appendix Table C3
2SLS Estimates: robustness
Transformed log life expectancy
Transformed log GDP per capita10 year lead 20 year lead 30 year lead 40 year lead No lead 10 year lead 20 year lead 30 year lead 40 year lead
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: dependent variable is log population
Log Life Expectancy 1.11 1.20 1.21 1.03 0.64 1.42 1.61 1.63 1.49 1.14
(0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.54) (0.60)
Log Life Expectancy -0.17 -0.25 -0.31 -0.37 -0.41 0.01 0.01 0.002 -0.01 -0.02
 x Interaction term (0.31) (0.31) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Number of observations 243 243 243 194 145 238 238 238 190 142
Number of countries 49 49 49 49 49 48 48 48 48 48
Panel B: dependent variable is log total GDP
Log Life Expectancy 0.78 0.28 -0.40 -0.78 -1.63 0.92 0.88 0.16 -0.15 -0.92
(0.69) (0.75) (0.74) (0.90) (1.18) (0.58) (0.58) (0.62) (0.71) (0.83)
Log Life Expectancy 0.69 -0.22 -0.78 -1.15 -1.37 0.13 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15
 x Interaction term (0.52) (0.60) (0.50) (0.54) (0.64) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Number of observations 243 243 243 194 145 238 238 238 190 142
Number of countries 49 49 49 49 49 48 48 48 48 48
Panel C: dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Log Life Expectancy -0.36 -0.93 -1.61 -1.81 -2.27 -0.48 -0.74 -1.47 -1.64 -2.06
(0.71) (0.74) (0.77) (0.87) (1.17) (0.51) (0.61) (0.64) (0.74) (1.11)
Log Life Expectancy 0.79 0.02 -0.47 -0.78 -0.96 0.12 0.03 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14
 x Interaction term (0.37) (0.46) (0.40) (0.42) (0.63) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
Number of observations 243 243 243 194 145 238 238 238 190 142
Number of countries 49 49 49 47 47 48 48 48 48 48
2SLS regressions with a full set of year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, in parentheses. 
Unbalanced panels with one observation per decade. Dependent variable: in Panel A, log total population; in Panel B, log total GDP; in Panel C, 
log GDP per capita. Independent variable in all panels is log life expectancy at birth and interaction of log life expectancy with, in columns 1-5, log 
GDP per capita in 1940, and in columns 6-10, investment share of GDP in 1940s. All variables are demeaned so main effects are evaluated at 
sample mean. In all columns, instruments are predicted mortality (baseline instrument) and interaction of predicted mortality with either log GDP 
p.c. in 1930 (columns 1-5) or investment share of GDP 1940s (columns 6-10). First stages not reported to save space. In columns 1 and 6, the 
dependent and independent variables are for the same time period; in columns 2-5, and 7-10, the dependent variable is t+10, t+20 etc., as 
indicated, while the independent variable is at time t. See text and Appendix A for details and definitions.
Appendix Table C4
Interactions with Initial Conditions: 2SLS Estimates
Interaction with investment as share of GDP in 1940s
No lead
Interaction with Log GDP per capita in 1930